

**THE STATES OF DELIBERATION**  
**of the**  
**ISLAND OF GUERNSEY**

**STATES' ASSEMBLY & CONSTITUTION COMMITTEE**

**REFERENDUM ON GUERNSEY'S VOTING SYSTEM**

The States are asked to decide whether, after consideration of the attached policy letter, they are of opinion:-

1. To agree to proceed with the holding of a referendum on the method of electing People's Deputies to the States of Deliberation;
2. To agree that the question to be put to the electorate in the referendum shall be along the following lines:

Which of the following options should be used to elect Deputies?

**Option A**

- 1 island-wide electoral district
- Each voter would have 38 votes at each election
- Each Deputy would serve for 4 years
- An election would be held every 4 years for all Deputies at once

**Option B**

- 7 electoral districts
- Each voter would have 5 or 6 votes at each election
- Each Deputy would serve for 4 years
- An election would be held every 4 years for all Deputies at once

**Option C**

- 2 electoral districts
- Each voter would have 9 or 10 votes at each election
- Each Deputy would serve for 4 years
- An election would be held every 2 years for half of Deputies each time

**Option D**

- 4 electoral districts
- Each voter would have between 9 and 11 votes at each election
- Each Deputy would serve for 4 years
- An election would be held every 4 years for all Deputies at once

**Option E**

- 1 island-wide electoral district
- Each voter would have 12 or 13 votes at each election
- Each Deputy would serve for 6 years
- An election would be held every 2 years for a third of Deputies each time

And

To agree that preferential and transferable voting (known as the Alternative Vote or Instant Run-Off) shall be used to determine which of options A to E was the most favoured.

OR, only if Proposition 2 shall have been defeated,

3. To agree that the question to be put to the electorate in the referendum shall be along the following lines:

Should Deputies be elected using the following voting system?

- 1 island-wide electoral district
  - Each voter would have 38 votes at each election
  - Each Deputy would serve for 4 years
  - An election would be held every 4 years for all Deputies at once
4. To agree to introduce the electoral system which is the most favoured in the referendum, provided that the number of persons voting in the referendum has exceeded a certain percentage of those persons inscribed on the Electoral Roll who are eligible to vote on the day of the referendum;
  5. To agree that the certain percentage referred to in the preceding Proposition shall be 40%;
  6. To agree that, in the event that turnout at the referendum is less than 40% of those persons inscribed on the Electoral Roll who are eligible to vote on the day of the referendum, the States' Assembly & Constitution Committee should within three months of the date of the referendum submit a policy letter to the States setting out any recommendations for reform to the electoral system which it considers necessary, having first taken into account how far short of 40% the turnout was, the number of votes cast for each outcome and (if the referendum was a multi-choice one) the share of the vote obtained by each of the five options A to E, and, in particular, the margin between the option which placed first and the other options;
  7. To agree that campaign groups should be permitted along the lines set out in paragraphs 13.1 to 13.9 inclusive;

8. To direct the Policy & Resources Committee to use its delegated authority to transfer funding of a maximum of £31,000 from the Budget Reserve to the 2017 revenue expenditure budget for the Royal Court to fund the 2017 costs associated with holding a referendum on the method of electing People's Deputies;
9. To direct the Policy & Resources Committee to recommend a 2018 Cash Limit for the Royal Court that includes a specific additional allowance of a maximum of £128,000, including a contingency sum of £5,000, to fund the 2018 costs associated with holding a referendum on the method of electing People's Deputies;
10. To direct the preparation of such legislation, based on the provisions of the attached policy letter, as shall be necessary to hold the referendum – such legislation to include, *inter alia*: all the provisions necessary to enable the referendum to be held, the question to be asked, arrangements for voting, provisions in respect of promotional expenditure, relevant offences including double voting, and the date on which the referendum shall be held.

The above Propositions have been submitted to Her Majesty's Procureur for advice on any legal or constitutional implications.

**THE STATES OF DELIBERATION**  
**of the**  
**ISLAND OF GUERNSEY**

**STATES' ASSEMBLY & CONSTITUTION COMMITTEE**

REFERENDUM ON GUERNSEY'S VOTING SYSTEM

The Presiding Officer,  
States of Guernsey,  
Royal Court House,  
St Peter Port

19<sup>th</sup> May, 2017

Dear Sir,

**1 Introduction / Executive Summary**

- 1.1 This policy letter is submitted in support of P. 2017/49. It sets out the terms on which the States' Assembly & Constitution Committee proposes to hold a referendum on the method of electing People's Deputies.
- 1.2 The Committee unanimously recommends the States to approve Propositions 1, 2 and 4 to 10 inclusive on P. 2017/49. Voting for these Propositions will empower the people of Guernsey to determine *their* future electoral system – by holding a referendum which offers a reasonable range of options and produces a clear result and by the States agreeing in advance that if there is a reasonable turnout at the referendum they will bind themselves to accept the result and carry into effect the will of the people.
- 1.3 This policy letter explains why a 'multi-option' referendum has considerable advantages over a 'single-option' referendum. However, the Committee is aware of a body of opinion which holds that the referendum should not allow the people of Guernsey to express their views on a range of methods of electing People's Deputies, but instead should restrict them to expressing a view on one method only: the election of all 38 deputies on an island-wide basis in a single election on one day. Proposition 3 on P. 2017/49 allows the States, if they have rejected Proposition 2 recommended by the Committee, to agree to hold a single-option referendum.
- 1.4 The Committee's proposals *inter alia* fulfil the following Resolutions made by the States on the 19<sup>th</sup> February, 2016:

*"1. That for the 2020 General Election and thereafter all deputies shall be elected on an island-wide basis and all voters shall have the same number of votes as there are deputies' seats provided that such a system shall first have been approved in an island wide referendum.*

*2. To direct the States Assembly and Constitution Committee to report to the States as expeditiously as possible detailing the proposals to give effect to Proposition 1 including the methodology of the election and the holding of a referendum."*

## **2 Developments in the electoral system – the 20<sup>th</sup> Century**

- 2.1 The first Deputies were elected in 1900. Until then no member of the States of Deliberation had been elected directly by the people. Jurats were elected by the States of Election and were *ex officio* members of the States of Deliberation; the Anglican rectors were also *ex officio* members; the parish representatives were elected by their respective douzaines; and the only other members were the Bailiff and the Law Officers of the Crown. From 1900 there were nine Deputies, all elected on an island-wide basis, albeit the franchise was greatly restricted<sup>1</sup>. Gradually the franchise was extended until it included all adults, the number of directly-elected members was increased and electoral constituencies were created. In 1920 the island was split into five electoral districts which between them elected 18 Deputies and in 1948 the parishes became the electoral districts and a total of 33 Deputies were elected<sup>2</sup>.
- 2.2 Also in 1948 the office of Conseiller was created *"...to ensure that the States should not at any moment, so far as we could avoid it, be overloaded with inexperienced men...in the hope that this would prevent decisions which would later be regretted being taken as a result of some passing mood or possibly even some passing events."*<sup>3</sup> The 12 Conseillers were elected not by the people but by the States of Election partly because *"[i]t would be very unfortunate if experienced men lost their seats simply because the electorate was ignorant of the services they had given to this Island."*<sup>4</sup>
- 2.3 The 1970s, 80s and 90s featured numerous States' debates about the office of Conseiller and in particular the method of their election.

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<sup>1</sup> The electorate was only the *chefs de famille* – those persons who were liable to pay parochial rates because they owned property worth £200 sterling. In 1892 that category had been extended to women who were ratepayers and who were unmarried or widows or legally separated from their husbands.

<sup>2</sup> The People's Deputies remained in the minority until the enactment of the Reform (Guernsey) Law, 1948.

<sup>3</sup> Representations to a Committee of the Privy Council on proposed reforms in the Channel Islands – page 18 of report of March, 1947

<sup>4</sup> Representations to a Committee of the Privy Council on proposed reforms in the Channel Islands – page 18 of report of March, 1947

- 2.4 In 1976 an investigation committee of the States found “...*no justifiable reason why Conseillers should not be elected by universal suffrage...*”<sup>5</sup>, but the States voted to maintain an electoral college. In 1983 and 1986 and 1991 similar debates ended in the same outcome. On each occasion one practical effect of the States’ decision was to reject the notion that some members (around 20% of the States) should be elected on an island-wide basis.
- 2.5 In 1992, having only a few months earlier approved a proposal to abolish the office of Conseiller, the States resolved that Conseillers should be retained but elected by universal suffrage and with an island-wide mandate. The first such election was held in 1994 when there were 26 candidates for 12 seats; and a second was held in 1997 when there were 10 candidates for six seats.
- 2.6 In 2000 the office of Conseiller was abolished and there was an equivalent increase in the number of Deputies, all of whom were elected in parishes and none on an island-wide basis.
- 2.7 From the inception of the office in 1948 until its abolition more than half a century later, Conseillers served terms of six years, which was twice the term of Deputies but shorter than the nine-year term recommended for the office initially.

### **3 Developments in the electoral system – the 21<sup>st</sup> Century**

- 3.1 In the 2000-04 term, during debates on changing the machinery of government, the States rejected various amendments which proposed reintroducing island-wide elections for a portion of the seats in the Assembly, but agreed that the Island should be divided into the seven electoral districts which exist today: St Peter Port South, St Peter Port North, St Sampson, Vale, Castel, West and South East.<sup>6</sup>
- 3.2 In 2006 the States directed the House Committee “*to undertake a comprehensive review of all practicable methods of introducing island-wide voting*”. That review was carried out in the following States’ term (2008-12) by the House Committee’s successor, the States’ Assembly & Constitution Committee, and culminated in 2011 in a debate in which the States rejected two options for the election of all Deputies on an island-wide basis and a third option for the election of only some Deputies on an island-wide basis.
- 3.3 The last States (2012-16) debated several requêtes and amendments which related to the electoral system. They rejected a proposal for all Deputies to be elected on an island-wide basis in one election on a single day; they rejected a proposal for only some deputies to be elected on an island-wide basis; and they rejected (albeit on a tied vote) a proposal for a referendum on electoral reform. They made and then rescinded a resolution to establish an investigation committee to review options for

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<sup>5</sup> Billet d’État XVIII of 1976, p 831

<sup>6</sup> The office of Douzaine Representative was also abolished in 2004.

electoral reform. They then approved an amendment which proposed that in 2020 all Deputies should be elected on an island-wide basis in one election on a single day but that in 2024 there should be a return to the present district-based electoral system before scrapping the latter provision and directing that the former should be put to a referendum to be held during the present States' term and directed the Committee to report to the States with further proposals.

- 3.4 In all, over the past 40 years, there have been more than 20 substantial States' debates about the procedure for electing Members of the States. This is the long and at times rather convoluted history which preceded the Committee's development of this policy letter.

#### **4 The purpose of the Committee's proposals**

- 4.1 Since its election in May, 2016 the Committee has been clear and consistent in its commitment to fulfil the States' Resolutions which were made in February, 2016 – by delivering a referendum in which the people of Guernsey may, if they so wish, determine that, with effect from 2020, all Deputies shall be elected on an island-wide basis in one election on a single day. The Committee's proposals give effect to this clear and consistent commitment.

- 4.2 However, the Committee's single most important objective in this matter is to empower the people of Guernsey to determine their future electoral system. This can be done only by holding a referendum which provides:

- choice for voters;
- clarity in the result; and
- certainty that the will of the people shall be carried into effect.

- 4.3 Proposition 2 provides choice for voters and also provides clarity in the result of the referendum. Propositions 4 and 5 provide certainty that, once the result of the referendum is known and if there has been a reasonable turnout, the will of the people shall be carried into effect by the States.

- 4.4 In the sections which follow the Committee explains why it considers these objectives – choice, clarity and certainty – to be so important and how the States can best meet them.

#### **5 A referendum providing choice**

- 5.1 The previous States committed to hold a referendum. The Committee believes that the present States should honour that commitment, but is aware that some States' Members take a different view. Hence Proposition 1 recommends that the States proceed with the holding of a referendum.

- 5.2 The States also committed that in the referendum voters should be able to express their opinion on whether all Deputies should be elected on an island-wide basis in one election on a single day – and similarly the Committee believes that the present States should honour that commitment.
- 5.3 These commitments can be fulfilled in a referendum which provides voters with an opportunity to support or reject a reasonable range of methods of electing Deputies, thereby presenting the people of Guernsey with genuine choice when determining their future electoral system. Section 8 of this policy letter sets out the reasons why the Committee believes that there should be a choice between five different methods.
- 5.4 It has been suggested that the referendum should restrict people to voting on the general principle of island-wide voting only. This would not fulfil the States' commitment to allow voters to express their opinion on the specific electoral system in which all Deputies would be elected on an island-wide basis in one election on a single day. Then the result of the referendum would require interpretation by the States: a "yes" vote would demonstrate support for island-wide voting generally but not for any one of the many different forms of island-wide voting which have been discussed over the years and could provoke interminable debate about which particular form of island-wide voting the public had implicitly endorsed, whereas a "no" vote would demonstrate opposition to island-wide voting generally without necessarily confirming support for the present electoral system. This would undermine the whole purpose of the exercise.
- 5.5 It has also been suggested that the referendum should restrict people to voting on one method of election only: the election of all 38 Deputies on an island-wide basis in a single election on one day. This would fulfil the States' commitment to allow voters to express their opinion on that specific electoral system, but the result of the referendum might still require interpretation by the States: a "no" vote would demonstrate opposition to that specific electoral system without confirming support for the present electoral system and thus would do nothing to settle debate about whether some other electoral system (including some other form of island-wide voting) should be adopted. Doubtless the States would stand accused of having favoured the *status quo* by offering voters (depending on one's point of view) only the purest or most extreme form of island-wide voting when other opportunities for reform not permitted on the ballot paper may have been more acceptable to the public.
- 5.6 As far as possible the States should avoid creating circumstances in which the result of the referendum requires interpretation by the States when for the past 40 years they have spent innumerable hours debating the electoral system without reaching any settled view. In holding a referendum every effort must be made to bring this matter to a conclusion, at least for the foreseeable future. In addition, the States' interpretation of the result would doubtless leave many voters feeling disenfranchised.



- 5.7 There are two ways in which a single-option referendum – along the lines outlined in paragraphs 5.4 or 5.5 – may be seen as simply unfair or possibly to have disenfranchised the people of Guernsey. First, without justification and completely unnecessarily, it would restrict the choice available to voters when asking them to determine their future electoral system. This would be particularly unfortunate in view of the diversity of opinion which is known to exist about the Island's electoral system. When a consultation was held during the States' term before last (albeit one which was self-selecting and uncontrolled) around four in five respondents favoured some form of island-wide voting but only half wanted all Deputies to be elected on an island-wide basis and fewer than a third wanted all Deputies to be elected on an island-wide basis in one election on a single day. Second, it would provide no opportunity for voters expressly to approve or reject the current electoral system. The only way to ensure that people are able to cast a clear vote one way or the other on the current electoral system is for the current system to appear on the ballot paper at the referendum.
- 5.8 The Committee has concluded that its single most important objective in this matter – genuinely to empower the people of Guernsey to determine their future electoral system – can best be met through a referendum in which voters are invited to select between the following five options:

**Option A**

- 1 island-wide electoral district
- Each voter would have 38 votes at each election
- Each Deputy would serve for 4 years
- An election would be held every 4 years for all Deputies at once

**Option B**

- 7 electoral districts
- Each voter would have 5 or 6 votes at each election
- Each Deputy would serve for 4 years
- An election would be held every 4 years for all Deputies at once

**Option C**

- 2 electoral districts
- Each voter would have 9 or 10 votes at each election
- Each Deputy would serve for 4 years
- An election would be held every 2 years for half of Deputies each time

### **Option D**

- 4 electoral districts
- Each voter would have between 9 and 11 votes at each election
- Each Deputy would serve for 4 years
- An election would be held every 4 years for all Deputies at once

### **Option E**

- 1 island-wide electoral district
- Each voter would have 12 or 13 votes at each election
- Each Deputy would serve for 6 years
- An election would be held every 2 years for a third of Deputies each time

5.9 The order of the options was determined by the Committee by lot at its meeting on the 26<sup>th</sup> of April, 2017. In addition to the five members of the Committee and members of the Established Staff, a representative of the media was present at the meeting and was invited to draw the lots and witnessed the rest of the process.

5.10 The Committee rejects suggestions that a multi-option referendum would be unconventional or too complicated. Multi-option referendums have been held in several advanced democracies around the world. For example, in Switzerland they are common; Sweden has held them; Andorra held one to determine its future electoral system; Australia held one to determine its national anthem; and New Zealand held them to determine first its electoral system and then its national flag.

5.11 It should also be noted that the consultation exercise on the electoral system held by the States in the term before last, which is referred to in paragraph 5.7, offered a choice of four electoral systems. The response rate was very high compared with most consultations and there were no reports of respondents having found it too complicated to choose between four different electoral systems.

## **6 A referendum providing clarity**

6.1 The Committee considers it essential that, post-referendum, it should be clear which option has “won” and equally essential that, if the electoral system is to be changed, the new system should be founded on having broad support among the people of Guernsey. The referendum will provide such clarity if an appropriate system of voting is used for it.

6.2 The Committee considered a “first past the post” voting system where each person would be permitted to select only one of the options A to E and the option with the most votes would be declared the winner. Experience of this voting system suggests that it is highly likely to lead to an indecisive outcome where the winning option fails to secure broad public support.

- 6.3 In the aforementioned consultation held during the States' term before last, in which respondents were permitted to vote for one option only, four electoral systems were offered, none secured the support of more than 31.2% of respondents, the difference between the top two options was only half of one per cent and the difference between the most and least popular options was less than 15 percentage points.
- 6.4 Clearly using a first past the post voting system in the referendum would risk no one option emerging with a clear lead, the winning option securing less than half and perhaps even less than a third of votes or potentially all five options each obtaining approximately a fifth of votes. Therefore the Committee ruled out using a first past the post voting system in the referendum.
- 6.5 Instead the Committee recommends using a well-established system of preferential and transferable voting in the referendum. Each voter would be invited to rank options A to E in their order of preference. They would place a '1' next to their first choice option; then if they wished they would place a '2' next to their second choice option; a '3' next to their third choice option; and so on until they no longer wished to express any preferences or had ranked all five options. Each voter could rank as many or as few options as they liked or vote for just one option.
- 6.6 Initially only first preference votes (marked '1') would be counted. If one of the options obtained more than 50% of first preference votes, it would immediately be declared to have won the referendum and no more counting would be necessary.
- 6.7 If, however, no option obtained more than 50% of first preference votes, there would be a second round of counting. Before this second round of counting began, the option which had obtained the fewest first preference votes would be eliminated from the contest and the ballot papers on which that unsuccessful option was marked as '1' would be redistributed among the remaining options according to the second preferences shown – or, if no second preference was shown, they would be discarded from the counting process. The votes cast in favour of each option would then be recounted.
- 6.8 This process of eliminating the least popular options and transferring lower preference votes would continue until one of the options A to E had obtained more votes than the other remaining options put together and that leading option would be declared to have won the referendum. This would ensure that the winning option had secured the broad support of the people.
- 6.9 This form of preferential and transferable voting is known as the alternative vote or instant runoff voting. It is used routinely in numerous developed democracies – for example to elect the President of Ireland, the House of Representatives in Australia, most state parliaments in Australia and many city, mayoral and district offices in the United States. It is also commonly used to elect leaders of political parties. Of

particular relevance to this policy letter, it was quite recently used successfully in a multi-option referendum to decide whether to have a new national flag of New Zealand.

- 6.10 Suggestions that this form of voting would be too complicated for Guernsey are unfortunate and should quickly be dismissed. It would be particularly odd if such suggestions were made by those who most strongly advocate single-election island-wide voting when under that system the electorate would have to decide how to cast up to 38 votes from possibly as many as 90 candidates. The widespread and successful use of this form of voting in other jurisdictions provides reassurance that it would be similarly successful in Guernsey.
- 6.11 Voters in Guernsey are used to voting in multi-member districts where they have to decide how to cast up to five or six votes (and in the past more) from perhaps twice as many candidates. The proposed voting system for the referendum has similarities, but on this occasion the different choices would have to be ranked numerically in order of preference rather than by the placing of an 'X'.
- 6.12 It is important that the process of voting is not confused and conflated with the process of counting votes. Counting preferential votes could be said to be more complicated than counting first past the post votes and certainly it is likely to take longer, but that is a matter for the counters, not for the voters. For voters preferential voting is very straightforward: an elector simply uses numbers from 1 upwards to rank the list of options in order of preference and that is it.

## **7 A referendum providing certainty**

- 7.1 It is essential that well ahead of polling day there is certainty about the status of the referendum. This means resolving early the question which arises ahead of all referendums: should the result be advisory or binding? The Committee gave this matter much thought, obtained advice from the Law Officers of the Crown and studied examples of binding and advisory referendums elsewhere.
- 7.2 The idea of making the referendum legally binding, i.e. where the States would be breaking the law by not implementing the winning option or perhaps even by introducing some other electoral system in the future, gives rise to numerous constitutional and practical issues. The principle of parliamentary sovereignty needs to be considered. The pre-eminence of the States in making domestic legislation is fundamental to parliamentary democracy in Guernsey. In June, 2016 the then Her Majesty's Procureur advised the Committee as follows: *"I have only been able to think of one way in which a referendum result could be made binding as a matter of law. That is by the States approving a Projet de Loi (and its obtaining Royal Sanction) containing a clause to the effect that it comes into force only if and when some official certification is provided that a prescribed percentages of votes cast in a statutorily backed referendum were in favour of the system set out in the new Law."* Taking this approach would be particularly difficult, if not impossible, for a multi-

option referendum, but even for a single-option referendum it would prove to have been a considerable waste of time if the voting system set out in the new Law was then rejected in the referendum. The expectation may then have been created that neither that voting system nor any other voting system could ever be introduced unless first approved in a referendum and it may be considered unwise to establish such a precedent. These and other related issues have been debated at great length whenever a referendum has been held nationally in the United Kingdom and help to explain why Parliament there has never been legally bound to implement the result of any referendum, including the most recent referendum on membership of the European Union.

- 7.3 A referendum which from the outset is merely advisory would give rise to fewer constitutional issues, but practically and politically would be no more satisfactory. The Committee's objective is genuinely to empower the people of Guernsey to determine their future electoral system – and the Committee believes this objective is shared by the majority of States' Members. There is an expectation that the will of the people, as expressed through the referendum, will be carried into effect by the States. If the perception is created that the result of the referendum is likely to be disregarded by the States, doubtless turnout will be depressed, cynicism will thrive and respect for the States will be diminished.
- 7.4 The issue about whether the referendum should or should not be legally binding has the potential to consume the States in much academic but ultimately unproductive debate which in any event may make little difference in practice. The Committee believes there is a simple and pragmatic way forward which avoids the disadvantages outlined in the preceding paragraphs.
- 7.5 The Committee recommends that the States should make a Resolution now agreeing in no uncertain terms to implement the winning option in the referendum – provided that voter turnout is sufficient to justify accepting the winning option as a legitimate expression of the will of the electorate.
- 7.6 In effect the Committee is asking the States – a year or so in advance of polling day – to bind themselves politically to the result of the referendum. In a separate Proposition the Committee recommends that this commitment of the States to bind themselves to implementing the winning option in the referendum should apply as long as turnout is not below 40 per cent of those inscribed on the Electoral Roll and eligible to vote on the day. It should be noted that "turnout" means all those who attended at a polling station and were given a ballot slip, including those who submitted blank or spoilt papers.
- 7.7 Taken together Propositions 4 and 5, if approved by the States, will establish the certainty that if at least 40% of those inscribed on the Electoral Roll and eligible to vote on the day turn out to vote in the referendum the States will implement the winning option and the will of the people shall be carried into effect.

- 7.8 If the referendum were entirely advisory, a turnout threshold would be unnecessary, but if the States are to agree in advance to bind themselves to the result it is important that the result demonstrates not so much the depth of feeling among a small number of devoted campaigners for any particular cause or option but rather demonstrates the breadth of opinion among the population generally.
- 7.9 Turnout thresholds are common in referendums, especially so for those which concern constitutional amendments or changes to the electoral system. For example, in Denmark a referendum to amend the constitution is considered valid only if the proposed amendment is supported by 40% of the eligible electorate; in Italy, Portugal, Sweden and some other European countries the result of a referendum is considered valid only if turnout reaches 50% of the eligible electorate; in the Netherlands even advisory referendums require turnouts of at least 30% to be considered valid; although it should be noted that for the past 20 years the UK has decided against turnout thresholds in referendums. What is recommended by the Committee – that the States agree to bind themselves to the result of the referendum and implement the winning option as long as turnout is not less than 40% of those inscribed on the Electoral Roll and eligible to vote on the day – is neither unusual nor unreasonable. The President argued in Committee for a lower threshold; one or two members argued for a higher threshold. There is no ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ threshold – it is a matter of judgement and it is for that reason that the Committee has set it out in a separate Proposition for the States, having taken into account the Committee’s advice and recommendation, to reach a conclusion in isolation of the other issues.
- 7.10 In New Zealand the turnout figures for the past three referendums about the electoral system were 55%, 85% and 73% respectively. In the United Kingdom’s referendum on the electoral system held in 2011, turnout was 42%. The turnout figures for the two referendums which Jersey has held regarding membership of their States’ Assembly were as follows: in the 2013 referendum about the voting system turnout was 26% and in the 2014 referendum about Parish Constables’ seats in the States turnout was 39%. In Jersey turnout for island-wide senatorial elections is normally in the region of 45%. In Guernsey’s 2016 General Election turnout was 72%.
- 7.11 The Committee will ensure that the turnout threshold approved by the States is carried prominently in promotional material ahead of the referendum – as part of efforts to encourage voters to turn out and exercise the right given to them by the States to determine their future electoral system and make the result of the referendum decisive and legitimate.
- 7.12 In the event that turnout at the referendum is less than 40% of those inscribed on the Electoral Roll, the Committee should be required to report to the States on the method of electing People’s Deputies and to make any recommendations it considers necessary, having first taken into account how far short of the 40% threshold the turnout was, the number of votes cast for each outcome and (if the

referendum was a multi-choice one) the share of the vote obtained by each of the five options A to E, and, in particular, the margin between the option which placed first and the other options . P. 2017/49 includes a separate Proposition to this effect.

## **8 Number of options to include on the ballot paper**

- 8.1 As one of its first tasks the Committee considered what would be the appropriate number of options to include on the ballot paper at the referendum. There was a balance to be struck between the objective of giving the people of Guernsey genuine choice when determining their future electoral system and the need to avoid the exercise becoming inaccessible and impractical.
- 8.2 In Guernsey, voters use on average between four and five votes at general elections. This is a relevant consideration because the use of preferential voting in the referendum would allow people, if they so wished, to rank every option on the ballot paper.
- 8.3 Other considerations are the likely appetite of electors to weigh up the pros and cons of various different methods of electing deputies, the advantage of each option on the ballot paper being sufficiently different from the others and the need for clarity when explaining and promoting the options in the period leading up to the referendum.
- 8.4 The Committee also researched the number of options included in other multi-option referendums held in advanced democracies. Aforementioned referendums in Sweden contained three options, in Australia four options and in New Zealand four options in one referendum (on its electoral system) and five options in another referendum.
- 8.5 The Committee concluded that there should be five options on the ballot paper at the referendum and strongly advises the States not to add further options.

## **9 Legislative requirements**

- 9.1 Other jurisdictions which have held referendums have normally put in place legislation specific to the referendum which sets out the procedures to be adopted for the referendum, the question to be asked, arrangements for voting, limits on expenditure, turnout threshold requirements, determining the result in the event of a tie, offences of double voting, etc. In other words, they have put referendums on a similar legal footing to General Elections. The Law Officers of the Crown advise that it would be prudent for Guernsey to adopt this approach.
- 9.2 There is no record of Guernsey ever having held a referendum. The States did make a Resolution in 2002 *“that steps shall be taken to make provision for the holding of referendums in Guernsey”* but in the years since this work has not been afforded priority by successive States. In any event, general legislation providing for the

States to organise referendums would not obviate the need for legislation to be enacted for each individual referendum setting out the procedures to be adopted, the question to be asked, etc.

- 9.3 Proposition 10 in P. 2017/49 allows the States to direct the preparation of legislation to put the referendum on a proper legal footing based on the terms of this policy letter and the Resolutions made by the States after debating it. This legislation will be a *Projet de Loi* which the States will be free to debate and amend in the normal way before the approved law is sent for Royal Sanction.
- 9.4 The Committee believes that, as far as possible, the referendum should be run as if it were a General Election in the sense of using the provisions of relevant existing legislation and procedures. For General Elections, the Reform (Guernsey) Law, 1948, as amended, and the *Loi relative au Scrutin Secret*, 1899, as amended, regulate matters such as polling stations, hours of voting, the Electoral Roll, entitlement to vote, absent voters, supervision of the ballot, access to the count, etc. These should form the basis of the new law to be drafted for the referendum, albeit that some elements will need to be modified for the particular circumstances of the referendum.
- 9.5 At this stage, the Committee does not envisage the need for a further policy letter before the States consider the legislation for the referendum, but if the need for one arises to clarify any specific direction the Committee will be ready to submit one expeditiously.

## **10 Eligibility to vote**

- 10.1 The categories of persons who are entitled to vote in the referendum will need to be defined and a list of eligible voters compiled. The Committee believes it is logical that anyone who is entitled to vote in a General Election should also be entitled to vote in the referendum. People entitled to vote in a General Election have their names inscribed on the Electoral Roll. The Committee respects that responsibility *“to advise the States and to develop and implement policies on...the electoral roll”* falls to the Committee for Home Affairs. The Committee is grateful to the Committee for Home Affairs for its advice in relation to the use of the Electoral Roll and for its endorsement of paragraphs 10.2 to 10.5.
- 10.2 It is proposed that the Electoral Roll which is used for the referendum is the one compiled by the Registrar-General of Electors in accordance with the provisions of Part IV of the Reform Law. Anyone who is entitled by the terms of the Reform Law to be on the Electoral Roll and to vote in a General Election would therefore be entitled to vote in the referendum.
- 10.3 It is further proposed that the present Electoral Roll should be used for the referendum. In other words, a new Electoral Roll should not be created for the referendum. This means that anyone who is currently enrolled (and whose name or



address has not changed since enrolment) need do nothing and would be eligible to vote in the referendum. However, in view of the time which has elapsed since the Roll was compiled and in order to maximise voter participation at the referendum, there should be a publicity campaign to encourage enrolment among people who are not currently on the Roll but who are eligible to be on it. This period would also enable anyone who needed to change their details – for example a change of surname or a change of address – to notify the Registrar-General accordingly. In any event it should be noted that the Electoral Roll is open now for new enrolments, changes of voters' details, etc.

- 10.4 As happens each year before the parochial elections and quadrennially before a General Election, the Roll will need to be closed at some point before the day of the referendum in order that copies of the Roll can be prepared for use at the polling stations. As at the General Election of 2016, it is hoped that the Roll could be closed much closer to polling day rather than the longer period which was historically the case.
- 10.5 Voters should be permitted to register to vote by post. This should be in accordance with the provisions of the Reform (Amendment) (Guernsey) Law, 1972, as amended.

## **11 Polling stations and voting**

- 11.1 The vast majority of the parishes have kindly advised that on the day of the referendum they are prepared to run the polling stations in the same way they do for General Elections. The Committee is very grateful to the parishes.
- 11.2 At General Elections each electoral district is served by between two and five polling stations. The Committee believes that for the referendum voters should have the opportunity to vote at a selection of polling stations, but only within their present electoral district, i.e. the electoral district under which their name is inscribed on the Electoral Roll. If voters were to be allowed to vote at polling stations outside their electoral district, at each polling station the parish officials and volunteers would need to use the whole of the Electoral Roll rather than the sections which relate to their electoral district only, which would be unfamiliar to them and consume more time and potentially make it harder to verify that no person had voted at more than one polling station. As for General Elections, the States would work with the parishes to secure the appropriate number and location of polling stations in each electoral district.
- 11.3 Although the proposed preferential voting system has not been used before in Guernsey, the Committee envisages that the time taken for each voter to cast their ballot should be only slightly longer than at a General Election. Each voter will be making up to five marks on the ballot paper compared with casting up to five or six votes at the 2016 General Election. Therefore, assuming they would be available, the present polling stations would be suitable, although more voting booths may be needed. Consideration will also be given to having someone at each polling station

ready to explain the voting system to any voter who requested such assurance.

- 11.4 The Committee recommends that the day of the week on which the referendum is held should follow the long-established practice for General Elections and be a Wednesday. The exact date will be set out in the legislation referred to in section nine of this policy letter.
- 11.5 It is envisaged that drafting and approving the legislation and putting in place all the procedural and logistical arrangements ahead of the referendum will take around 12 months. Therefore the date of the referendum would be approximately one year from the date on which the States make Resolutions after debate on this policy letter. The Committee has requested that this policy letter be debated by the States at their meeting which starts on the 21<sup>st</sup> of June, 2017, which should allow the referendum to be held in June, 2018. There are two reasons to hold the referendum in June rather than later next year: first, from 2020, General Elections will be held in June and it makes some sense to align the months of polling days; second, and more importantly, the referendum could result in major changes to the electoral system which could take up to two years to implement ahead of the General Election in June, 2020.
- 11.6 At the General Election in 2016 all polling stations were open from 8 am to 8 pm except for those in St Sampson which were open from 10 am to 8 pm. Of course in the referendum the question and the ballot paper will be the same for every voter across the Island and the Committee considers it essential that every voter has the same right to vote, including equal access to polling stations. The Committee proposes that the hours of polling in all parts of Guernsey should be 8 am to 8 pm. The States will work with parishes to overcome any challenges which may be encountered in opening polling stations during those hours.
- 11.7 The Committee recommends that voting should be carried out using paper ballot slips and pencils, as is the case at General Elections. As far as the Committee is aware this will be the first referendum ever held in Guernsey and, if the Committee's recommendations are approved, it will also feature the use of preferential and transferable voting for the first time. It would be unwise to introduce at the same time another new feature in the form of electronic voting.

## **12 Counting of votes and declaration of result**

- 12.1 When, between 1994 and 2000, Conseillers were popularly elected on an island-wide basis votes were cast and counted district by district (or rather parish by parish, as it was then). Each district announced its own results, having first communicated them to the Presiding Officer, who later announced the final, overall result.
- 12.2 Although the Committee proposes that votes in the referendum should be cast in electoral districts, the use of preferential and transferable voting means that the votes cannot sensibly be counted district by district. Whether votes need to be

transferred to second (and lower) preferences is dependent on the total number of ballot papers returned and the number of first-preference votes cast for an option. This makes it necessary to count all the votes centrally at one location. Parish volunteers may still be able to assist at the count, albeit at a central location, and indeed one parish has already kindly suggested this to the Committee.

- 12.3 The Committee proposes that the count would be carried out under the supervision of a Returning Officer nominated by the Committee for approval by the Royal Court. The Returning Officer would have essentially the same duties and powers as district returning officers at General Elections.
- 12.4 In view of the potential number of ballot papers, the use of preferential voting, the possibility of more than one round of counting and the need to maximise the availability of volunteers, it would be sensible for the count to begin not immediately after polls close, as is the case at General Elections, but rather the following morning.
- 12.5 In the interests of openness and transparency, the Committee believes that it should be possible for interested parties and other members of the public, subject to their adhering to certain guidelines, to watch the counting of votes. This objective should be reflected in the legislation and borne in mind when organising the venue and making other logistical arrangements for the count.
- 12.6 After each round of counting, if indeed there was more than one round, the Returning Officer would announce the votes obtained by each of the options, and the lowest-placed option which had therefore been eliminated, before the next round of counting would begin. Eventually a round of voting would lead to one option obtaining more votes than the other remaining options put together and the Returning Officer would declare that option to have won the referendum.
- 12.7 The Committee recommends that votes should be counted manually, as is the case at General Elections. Paragraph 11.7 explains why it would be imprudent to use the Island's first referendum to trial new features which are not essential to the referendum itself. Security is another consideration. Recently in other jurisdictions serious doubts have been cast about the validity of election results because of allegations of interference in parts of the process carried out electronically. The Committee wishes to avoid the validity of the referendum result being questioned because of any problem with the way the referendum is administered.

### **13 Expenditure on the promotion of options, campaign groups, etc.**

- 13.1 It is important in advance of the referendum for information to be made readily available about each of the options A to E. It is also important that no individual or group should be able unduly to influence the outcome of the referendum by spending disproportionate amounts of money promoting their preferred option(s).

- 13.2 The Committee recommends that these objectives can best be met by providing for the appointment of official campaign groups to promote each of the options A to E and by imposing restrictions, which would not be dissimilar from those imposed at General Elections, on how much could be spent and by whom in the promotion of any of the options.
- 13.3 There is merit in options A to E having only one campaign group each: the Committee believes the ideal scenario would be five campaign groups in total. This approach is conventional for referendums held in other jurisdictions.
- 13.4 These officially-recognised campaign groups should be able to claim a limited grant from the States. This would encourage the formation of such groups, defray some of the costs they incur in promoting their favoured option and help create conditions in which the groups start with a fair and equal chance of succeeding. The Committee suggests that such grants need be no more than £5,000 per campaign group, i.e. a maximum of £25,000 in total. Campaign groups should be permitted to spend money in addition to any States' grant, but a cap would need to be placed on such expenditure. The Committee envisages that each campaign group would be permitted to spend in the region of £10,000. All expenditure incurred by campaign groups would need to be declared to the Returning Officer after the referendum. The Committee believes that no person or group other than an official campaign group (other than the States in the provision of technical information) should be permitted to spend any money or incur any money's worth in value to promote an outcome.
- 13.5 The Committee suggests that the process for appointing campaign groups should be along the following lines. Applications would be invited from persons wishing to work together as an official campaign group for an option. Applicants, who could be serving or former Deputies or members of the public, would be evaluated by an appointment panel of, say, three independent persons put forward by the Committee for approval by the States. The key criterion should be that persons applying to be an official campaign group for an option appear to the appointing panel to be the most able to promote the case in favour of that particular option.
- 13.6 The Committee would wish to make rules along the lines of The Electoral Roll (Availability) Rules, 2016 to permit official campaign groups to have copies of the Electoral Roll to assist them in their promotional activities.
- 13.7 A method would need to be agreed for dealing with circumstances where one (or more) of the options did not have a group wishing to be its campaign group. In other jurisdictions this has often been addressed by either not appointing any campaign groups unless each option has one or by the government acting as a surrogate and providing technical information where no campaign group exists. The Committee prefers the second solution because the first would be rather unfair on any groups which do organise themselves and submit strong applications. The Committee also believes there will be sufficient news coverage of all the options – so a satisfactory

minimum amount of publicity will be generated for every option.

- 13.8 The Committee believes that the rules which apply in the referendum regarding the display of material by supporters of the different options should as far as possible mirror those which apply in General Elections. They should also benefit from the planning exemption in relation to election signs under the *Land Planning and Development (Exemptions) Ordinance, 2007*, which would mean that campaigners would not be required to obtain planning permission to display temporary promotional signs in the period immediately preceding the referendum. There should be the usual ban on the display of material on any States-owned property except those occupied as homes.
- 13.9 The legislation referred to in section nine of this policy letter would include all the detailed rules and regulations necessary to allow for the appointment and operation of campaign groups and to govern expenditure on the promotion of options generally.

#### **14 The question on the ballot paper**

- 14.1 As explained in section nine, the legislation will include the exact wording of the question which is to appear on the ballot paper at the referendum.
- 14.2 The wording of the question must be constructed carefully. The advice of learned organisations is consistent: the question must not influence voters but rather should be presented in a neutral way; the question must not mislead voters but rather should be presented clearly and unambiguously; and the implications of the voting options should be easy to understand. There must be no danger of a voter not knowing what he or she is being asked to decide or voting differently from how he or she intended.
- 14.3 The wording of the question has been tested on members of the public in a number of focus groups. These were chaired by an independent facilitator and at no time was any member of the Committee – nor indeed any other member of the States – present at the focus groups. Their sole purpose was to test whether various forms of question were easy for the electorate to understand. Participants were chosen to ensure that the focus groups were demographically and socially diverse.
- 14.4 The results of the focus groups showed that participants understood the proposed five-option question and knew what they were being asked to vote on.
- 14.5 The Committee proposes that the question on the ballot paper should be worded along the following lines (an example of such a ballot slip is at Appendix 2):

## **Which of the following options should be used to elect Deputies?**

### **Option A**

- 1 island-wide electoral district
- Each voter would have 38 votes at each election
- Each Deputy would serve for 4 years
- An election would be held every 4 years for all Deputies at once

### **Option B**

- 7 electoral districts
- Each voter would have 5 or 6 votes at each election
- Each Deputy would serve for 4 years
- An election would be held every 4 years for all Deputies at once

### **Option C**

- 2 electoral districts
- Each voter would have 9 or 10 votes at each election
- Each Deputy would serve for 4 years
- An election would be held every 2 years for half of Deputies each time

### **Option D**

- 4 electoral districts
- Each voter would have between 9 and 11 votes at each election
- Each Deputy would serve for 4 years
- An election would be held every 4 years for all Deputies at once

### **Option E**

- 1 island-wide electoral district
- Each voter would have 12 or 13 votes at each election
- Each Deputy would serve for 6 years
- An election would be held every 2 years for a third of Deputies each time

## **15 Options A to E – general points**

- 15.1 Sections 16 to 20 of the policy letter describe in more detail the electoral systems set out at options A to E, including their advantages and disadvantages and some of the practical implications of adopting them in Guernsey. Appendix 1 sets out several other electoral systems which were considered and the reasons why the Committee is recommending that they be excluded from the ballot paper at the referendum.

- 15.2 At this stage the Committee is not proposing all of the detailed arrangements for the introduction of any of the options A to E. Once the result of the referendum is known, the Committee will report to the States proposing the detailed arrangements for the introduction of the electoral system which was successful at the referendum, unless of course option B prevails, in which case no changes would be necessary. Any future policy letter would need to include information to allow decisions to be made about, *inter alia*, the use of hustings, the distribution of manifestos, electronic voting and electronic counting of votes, costs to the States and to candidates, transitional provisions, etc.
- 15.3 In relation to costs, what can be said with certainty even at this stage is that for all of the options A to E the annualised costs to the States should be in the tens, rather than hundreds, of thousands of pounds, but clearly costs are likely to be greatest for electoral systems which require elections more often or more than one election each time.
- 15.4 It should be noted that the parishes voluntarily carry out a significant part of the running of general elections, including providing venues for hustings and voting (for which any costs incurred are reimbursed by the States) and people to administer polling stations and count votes. The Committee wishes to place on record its appreciation of the invaluable assistance of the parishes and their volunteers. The costs borne by the States would be increased should the assistance of the parishes ever be withdrawn under any of the options A to E. It may be that this would become more likely under the options which move furthest away from the present electoral system.
- 15.5 The estimated costs of the referendum, which are set out in paragraphs 22.4 and 22.10 to 22.12, are one-off costs and completely separate from the costs associated with either maintaining the electoral system at option B or introducing any of the electoral systems at options A, C, D or E.
- 15.6 In the descriptions of the electoral systems which follow it must be remembered that one person's reason to adopt a system is another person's reason not to and *vice versa*.
- 15.7 It should be noted that in the tables at the end of each option the figures for the total population vary by option. That is because the e census states how many people live in Guernsey in total but it is not able to establish the exact residential address of a small number of people. The total figures for the two single district options (A and E) therefore show the full population (62,723) while the population figures for the other options total 62,473, to reflect the fact that the exact residential addresses of 250 people are not known in the e census data.

## Section 16: Option A

**16     *In Option A all Deputies would be elected on one day for one island-wide constituency. All electors would have as many votes as there are seats, i.e. 38 at the present time. Every candidate would stand to be elected by the whole Island. Every elector, regardless of where he or she lives, would be free to choose from the entire list of candidates. All deputies would serve for a term of four years.***

16.1    Some people argue that Option A would strengthen democracy in the Island. Certainly it would enable every elector to have some influence over every seat in the States, which in the absence of political parties is seen by some people as the best way of securing a legitimate democratic mandate for the whole of the States. The vast majority of propositions which go before the States affect the whole Island and so it is understandable that some electors wish to have an influence over every seat rather than over only one-sixth or one-seventh of the Assembly, as is the case at present. Proponents of this electoral system believe that government would be improved by making every Deputy, in theory at least, electorally accountable to every elector.

16.2    Those who do not support Option A point out that allowing every elector to have some influence over every seat in the States necessarily means that the weight of each individual vote would diminish. Moreover, they doubt whether it would be practicable to ask electors to cast up to 38 votes from a list of probably between 70 and 90 candidates. In 2007 the Electoral Reform Society, which has been advising on political and electoral reform for more than 130 years, advised the States:

*“There are possible models for all-island voting, but unfortunately they all present significant practical difficulties because of the size of the States of Deliberation and the lack of political parties in Guernsey... a nationwide constituency system could only feasibly operate in Guernsey if... candidates coalesced into political parties or (at the very least) electoral blocs [or] there were fewer seats to be filled...”.*

16.3    Some proponents of Option A argue that it would make elections for sitting members more rigorous because they would face the judgement of the whole Island rather than merely one district. On the other hand some opponents of Option A argue that it would disproportionately favour well-known candidates, including sitting members of the States. They also believe – because to be elected a candidate may well require a much smaller percentage of the vote – that it would increase the likelihood of candidates being elected with the support of voters who were extremely loyal but very few in number. It is conceivable, despite the size of his or her electoral district growing six- or seven-fold, that some candidates could be elected with far fewer votes than it requires to be elected in districts today, which could lead to doubts about the legitimacy of some deputies’ mandates. Others may argue that this could make the States more representative of the full range of public opinion in the Island.



- 16.4 The absence of political parties and the effects of that on the electoral system are referred to in the aforementioned advice of the Electoral Reform Society. It may be – but it is by no means certain – that introducing Option A would encourage the formation of political parties or electoral alliances, partly to assist candidates who may fear being unable properly to promote themselves and their policies as just one among perhaps 70, 80 or 90 others, partly to provide electors with a clearer understanding of the range of choices before them and partly to make the process generally more practicable for candidates and voters. The Committee makes no comment on whether the emergence of such parties or alliances would be a good development or not, but it would be naïve not to consider it as a possibility. If parties formed then it is possible that some form of proportional representation system would need to be introduced to ensure that one party did not win all the seats.
- 16.5 There are very few democracies which conduct parliamentary elections as a single district (i.e. the equivalent of island-wide or jurisdiction-wide voting). Examples include the Knesset in Israel, where electors vote only for parties and not for individual candidates and seats are allocated by proportional representation, and the Parliament in Gibraltar, which has a well-developed party system and only 17 seats.
- 16.6 In 1994 and 1997 Conseillers were elected on an island-wide basis. Some candidates did carry out door-to-door canvassing in certain areas. However, no candidate was able to canvass the entire Island or even most of the Island in an election campaign lasting only a few weeks. Some electors greatly value the opportunity to speak on their doorstep to as many of their candidates as possible and many candidates report at least some correlation between the number of households canvassed and the number of votes obtained. Other electors would prefer not to be canvassed at home and would consider the likelihood of receiving fewer such visits to be an advantage of Option A.
- 16.7 The present, district-based electoral system allows for Returning Officers to arrange hustings meetings in their district at which electors ask candidates questions without notice, typically for up to three hours. If there were too many candidates there would be insufficient time for electors to ask a range of questions and for candidates to develop their answers. Even with only 15 candidates it is unlikely there would be time for electors to ask more than a dozen questions and for candidates to speak for more than 12 minutes each, in total. There must also be some doubt about the appetite of electors to listen to so many candidates answering the same question. Clearly Option A, with perhaps between 70 and 90 candidates standing in one election, would not allow for all candidates to face electors simultaneously in the traditional format of hustings meetings. Some electors would consider this to be a significant loss: they may argue that hustings meetings provide a valuable opportunity to assess the relative merits of all the candidates when they are answering questions under at least a degree of pressure which it could be argued tests skills which are essential in politics. Other electors would consider this to be no

loss at all: they may argue that the majority of electors do not attend hustings meetings and that there are better ways for candidates to communicate with electors. If Option A was introduced it may be that hustings meetings would still be held, but candidates would be split into batches – for example, if there were 77 candidates, there could be seven hustings meetings held on seven different occasions each featuring 11 candidates, albeit that perhaps only the most resilient elector would attend them all in order to hear from all the candidates. This could be mitigated by the use of technology such as live streaming and making the broadcast available online afterwards.

- 16.8 Alternatively, or in addition, drop-in sessions – where candidates speak more informally to one or a few electors at a time – may come to play a greater role in election campaigns. Some districts already organise drop-in sessions ahead of elections. Some electors prefer them because it allows more personal and informal contact with candidates. If there were several drop-in sessions there would be more opportunity for contact at a time convenient to the elector. Drop-in sessions may also allow issues of particular importance to an elector to be pursued in more detail. Others are more sceptical about drop-in sessions and see them as a poor substitute for hustings meetings. There are concerns that when they are speaking only to one voter at a time it is too easy for candidates to alter their answers – and indeed to give completely contradictory answers – depending on the views of the elector with whom they are in conversation. The same thing could be said of door-to-door canvassing, but not of hustings meetings where candidates must set out their views in front of dozens and often hundreds of people who inevitably hold vastly different opinions themselves. Drop-in sessions also do not suit reserved electors who do not want to speak to candidates face-to-face. Nor are the exchanges published for the benefit of electors who were not present to hear the questions and answers. It would be difficult, if not impossible, for an elector to speak individually to 70 to 90 candidates even if he or she attended several drop-in sessions.
- 16.9 At recent elections some candidates have begun to make more use of electronic means to communicate with their electorate, e.g. audio and video manifestos, websites, e mails and social media. The use of such technology would doubtless accelerate and become more important if Option A was introduced.
- 16.10 Whichever electoral system is adopted, it is essential that candidates have every opportunity to distribute manifestos to all of their electorate. At present printed manifestos are the primary means by which candidates communicate their views to their electors and this may well continue to be the case for some time.
- 16.11 Option A would require electors to receive manifestos from probably between 70 and 90 candidates. Most candidates produce manifestos of at least two sides of A4; many candidates use four sides of A4; and a small number use six sides or more. Assuming there were 80 candidates each producing a manifesto of four sides of A4, every elector would receive manifestos totalling 320 pages of A4. Some electors would find this a daunting prospect and weighing up the merits of each manifesto

against all the others could be challenging. Other electors would consider this acceptable in order to be able to have up to 38 votes and therefore some influence over every seat in the States. The rules relating to grants to candidates could be adjusted to encourage them to limit manifestos to one or two sides of A4, which could reduce the total number of manifesto pages to around 100 or 150.

- 16.12 In the 1994 and 1997 island-wide Conseiller elections candidates' manifestos were published in a newspaper distributed as a supplement to the Guernsey Evening Press & Star. Each candidate was allocated one page. The cost of printing was borne by the States. It may be possible to adopt a similar arrangement for future elections, although it must be remembered that not every elector reads the local newspaper. In any event it may be considered unreasonable to place any restrictions on the freedom of candidates to choose the methods by which they distribute manifestos to their electorate.
- 16.13 Under the present electoral system every candidate has an electorate of between approximately 3,000 and 5,500, depending on his or her electoral district. Under Option A every candidate would have an electorate of 30,000 or more. All things being equal it has to be assumed that printing and distributing manifestos to five to ten times as many electors would increase the total cost of the exercise. The proportion of costs borne by the States and the proportion borne by the candidate would need to be carefully considered in order to limit the expense to the taxpayer while at the same time not placing an unreasonable financial burden in the way of a person who wishes to stand for election. It is possible, if the States in effect took over the role of distributing all manifestos, that the cost to the States could be offset by reducing or even eliminating the grant to candidates (which in 2016 stood at £600 per candidate).
- 16.14 Arrangements at polling stations and for the counting of votes would need to be adjusted. Electors would have 38 votes rather than five or six as at present and therefore many voters would inevitably take longer to vote and more polling booths may be required at each polling station. At the 2016 General Election around 93,000 votes were cast. Under Option A the maximum number of votes cast, if all the people who voted at the last Election voted and used all their votes, would be approximately 800,000. Even if there was a similar turnout but voters used only half their votes they might still cast 400,000 votes or more. Therefore, it may be necessary to use electronic counting. The Committee would need to work with the parishes to ascertain their willingness to be involved in such a different electoral process. Such logistical challenges are certainly not insurmountable, but they emphasise how single-election island-wide voting would completely change the character of elections in Guernsey. This would be viewed by some people as a positive step and as a negative one by others.
- 16.15 Option A would require no transitional provisions. All members could be elected under this system from the next General Election in June, 2020.

Districts	Total Population per district	Number of seats	Votes per elector
1. – All parts and areas of Guernsey, Herm and Jethou	62,723	38	38

## Section 17: Option B

**17     *Option B is the present electoral system unchanged. Guernsey is divided into seven electoral districts: St Peter Port South, St Peter Port North, St Sampson, the Vale, the Castel, the West and the South-East. Each district elects five or six deputies depending on the size of its population. Every elector has as many votes as there are seats in his or her district. All Deputies serve for a term of four years.***

17.1 For the purpose of conducting parliamentary elections most jurisdictions around the world sub-divide into electoral districts or constituencies. There are many examples of single-member districts, such as in the United Kingdom, where each district is represented by one member only; and many examples of multi-member districts, such as in Guernsey, where each district is represented by several members. As stated previously, there are very few democracies which conduct parliamentary elections as a single district (i.e. the equivalent of island-wide or jurisdiction-wide voting).

17.2 Section 2 of the policy letter explains that the whole of Guernsey was a single electoral district in the early years of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century when there were only nine directly-elected seats in the States and the franchise was greatly restricted. As the number of directly-elected seats increased and the franchise was extended, it was felt necessary to split the Island into electoral districts, and for approximately the past one hundred years all Deputies have been elected in districts (or formerly parishes).

17.3 Option B, i.e. the *status quo*, ensures that every geographic area in the Island has a number of Deputies who are elected to represent it in the States. Every Deputy is accountable at a very local level to 5,500 electors or fewer and this may encourage Deputies to be more responsive to constituency matters than they would be otherwise. Some electors feel that they are able to maintain particularly strong links and raise issues with ‘their’ Deputies in a way which could not be replicated if the Island became a single district or even if it was divided into fewer larger districts. Critics fear that maintaining relatively small electoral districts encourages narrow parochialism among Deputies who should be more concerned with issues of strategic importance to the whole Island (what would be called “the national interest” elsewhere).

- 17.4 Turnout at General Elections has increased substantially since the present, district-based electoral system was introduced in 2004. In 1994, in the first island-wide election for 12 Conseillers, 17,080 people voted. In 1997, in the second island-wide election for six Conseillers, 11,521 people voted, whereas in the district-based elections of 2016 21,803 people voted, which was an increase of nearly 90% (comparing the 2016 figures with those for 1997) despite the population of the Island increasing by only 6.5% in the same period. Nonetheless, turnout at elections in Guernsey generally remains quite low – the turnout figures are a percentage of those persons inscribed on the Electoral Roll and a substantial number of adults are not enrolled. Some people have a perception, the veracity of which is frequently contested, that district-based elections depress voter turnout because they necessarily restrict the number of candidates available to any elector and some electors regularly say they will not vote in the absence of island-wide voting.
- 17.5 Some people are undoubtedly of the view that Option B provides a greater degree of security for Deputies who it is claimed would find it harder to retain their seats if there were fewer larger districts or one single district. The logic of this view is debatable – at the last Election ten sitting Members lost their seats in the districts – but the prevalence of this view in the Island should not be under-estimated.
- 17.6 Dividing the Island into seven electoral districts means that a voter is limited to having a direct electoral influence over no more than 15% of the seats in the States – or to put it in reverse an individual voter cannot directly influence 85% or more of the seats in the States. Of course this is inherent to any electoral system based on constituencies or districts, but the feelings of disenfranchisement which it can elicit may be particularly understandable in an Island without political parties where there is often only a very loose connection between the choices made at the ballot box and the decisions made by government.
- 17.7 The way in which Option B operates in practice is well-known to candidates and the electorate. Clearly there are no major logistical concerns.
- 17.8 Candidates are able to disseminate their election literature and promote their views relatively easily and inexpensively (including with the assistance of a grant from the States). Each elector receives a manageable number of manifestos – typically around 11 or 12. Much use is made of door-to-door canvassing – many candidates call at a substantial proportion of their electors' homes and some candidates call more or less at them all. At recent elections some districts have organised drop-in sessions for electors to speak to candidates one-on-one. In every district there are traditional hustings meetings and some districts hold more than one. The preceding section of the policy letter discussed all the advantages and disadvantages of these various methods of communication between candidate and elector.
- 17.9 The parochial authorities run the polling stations, count the votes and announce the results. The electoral districts are small enough that results are announced the same night that polls close.

17.10 Proponents of Option B argue that the ease of communication between the candidate and the elector allows candidates who have little or no public profile before an election to flourish during the campaign. A relatively unknown candidate can secure considerable support through a good performance at a hustings meeting and perhaps even more so through diligent door-to-door canvassing. This is one of the reasons why some people are anxious to retain an electoral system which allows for traditional hustings meetings and door-to-door canvassing, which would become more challenging if electoral districts were enlarged and completely impracticable if the Island was made into a single electoral district.

17.11 Option B would require no transitional provisions as the present system would simply continue.

Districts	Total Population per district	Pure division	Votes per elector
1. – St Peter Port (South)	8,457	5.1	5
2. – St Peter Port (North)	10,423	6.3	6
3. – St Sampson	8,948	5.4	6
4. – Vale	9,524	5.8	6
5. – Castel	8,739	5.3	5
6. – West (St Saviour, St Pierre du Bois, Torteval and Forest)	7,439	4.5	5
7. – South East (St Martin and St Andrew)	8,929	5.4	5

17.12 Many of the arguments for and against Options A and B apply to a greater or lesser extent to the remaining three options: C, D and E. For ease of reading they are not all repeated *in extenso* in the succeeding paragraphs.

## Section 18: Option C

**18** *In Option C the Island would be split into two electoral districts. Each district would have between 18 and 20 seats. Every two years each district would elect approximately half of its Deputies (e.g. nine or ten Deputies). Every elector would have as many votes as there are seats to fill in his or her district. All Deputies would serve for a term of four years.*

- 18.1 It is possible to split the Island into two contiguous districts with very similar populations without dividing any parish other than St Peter Port in the way it is at present. There would be a “North and Centre” district comprising the Vale, St Sampson, St Peter Port North and St Andrew; and a “South and West” district comprising St Peter Port South, St Martin, the Forest, St Pierre du Bois, Torteval, St Saviour and the Castel. Using the latest e-census data, one district would comprise 31,243 people and the other district would comprise 31,216 people.
- 18.2 By splitting the Island into two electoral districts, Option C would allow every voter to have a direct influence over half the Deputies’ seats in the States. At the same time, by electing only nine or ten seats in each district each time, it is likely that elections would produce a practicable number of candidates.
- 18.3 Option C might be particularly attractive to people who believe that democracy would be strengthened by making each deputy more accountable to a much greater proportion of the population but who fear that turning the Island into a single district and electing 38 deputies from perhaps twice as many candidates on one day would be impracticable. It could be argued that Option C overcomes the most significant disadvantages, but does not necessarily share the most significant advantages, of Options A and B.
- 18.4 Some voters would welcome elections every two years; others would be content to go to the polls more often to obtain the advantages of Option C; but some voters would find it undesirable. Holding elections for half the Assembly every two years could provide the States with more continuity because the potential for turnover in membership at each election would be reduced; and also with more frequent renewal because invariably there would be at least some new members joining every two years. Improving the balance between continuity and renewal could be a significant advantage, particularly if it addressed the lacuna in activity which has tended to affect each newly-elected Assembly for several months since General Elections in their full sense were introduced in 2004. On the other hand there may be fears that elections every two years, albeit for only half the seats each time, would prove disruptive and also there is some advantage in a General Election where all seats are up for election and theoretically voters have a chance to replace their entire parliament.
- 18.5 Option C would most likely satisfy voters who believe that seven much smaller districts, i.e. the present system, encourages narrow parochialism, but it would most likely dissatisfy voters who value maintaining stronger local links with ‘their’ Deputies which the present system tends to promote.
- 18.6 A diligent candidate with sufficient time available during the day could certainly canvass one-third and possibly anything up to one-half of the districts envisaged in Option C. If turning the Island into a single district, i.e. Option A, would greatly discourage canvassing, it is felt that turning the Island into two districts, i.e. Option C, would have not nearly the same effect because many candidates would doubtless

consider it still very worthwhile to call on one-third to one-half of their electors. Nevertheless the impossibility of canvassing an entire district would perhaps slightly increase the possibility of political parties or electoral alliances developing, though the impetus for this would probably be weaker under Option C than under Option A.

- 18.7 If traditional hustings meetings were to continue under Option C, it may be that candidates would be split into two batches to avoid perhaps as many as two dozen or so appearing on the same occasion. Greater use may be made of drop-in sessions.
- 18.8 Option C may require electors to receive manifestos from perhaps between 15 and 25 candidates. This may mean receiving a total of 100 pages of A4 unless efforts have been made to encourage the production of much shorter manifestos, the advantages and disadvantages of which were discussed earlier in the policy letter.
- 18.9 There is a convention that the States do not meet after nominations for election have opened in order that serving members cannot use the Assembly as a platform from which to electioneer. At present that period when the States do not meet – which lasts about six weeks – occurs once every four years. If the convention was to be maintained, in Option C that period when the States do not meet would occur once every two years. This could be accommodated quite easily, but the calendar for States' Meetings would obviously need to be adjusted slightly.
- 18.10 Option C may lend itself to the introduction, or rather re-introduction, of electing some or all seats on States' Committees more frequently than once every four years. The Committee's predecessors consulted members of previous States on this matter and found those in favour and those against to be broadly in balance.
- 18.11 For obvious reasons it would not be possible to implement Option C in its final form immediately. Therefore, transitional arrangements would be required. One possibility would be to split the Island into two districts ahead of the next General Election in 2020, elect all seats on the same day on that one occasion (i.e. elect 18 or 20 deputies from each district) and then commence biennial elections in 2022. The transitional arrangements would need to be agreed by the States if Option C won the referendum. At the same time the States would need to decide whether to retain 38 deputies with 19 seats in each district or to have 40 deputies with 20 in each district or 36 with 18 in each district.



Districts	Total population per district	Total seats per district	Votes per elector at each election
1. – the Vale, St Sampson, St Peter Port North and St Andrew	31,243	19	9 or 10
2. – St Peter Port South, St Martin, the Forest, St Pierre du Bois, Torteval, St Saviour and the Castel	31,216	19	9 or 10

## Section 19: Option D

**19** *In Option D the Island would be split into four electoral districts. Each district would have between nine and 11 seats depending on the size of its population. Every elector would have as many votes as there are seats to fill in his or her district. All deputies would be elected on the same day to serve for a term of four years.*

19.1 It is possible to split the Island into four contiguous districts without dividing any parish other than St Peter Port in the way it is at present. The four districts would be as follows: St Peter Port South and St Martin; St Peter Port North, St Andrew and Forest; Castel, St Saviour, St Pierre du Bois and Torteval; and Vale and St Sampson. Using the latest e-census data, the first three districts would have very similar populations and the population of the fourth would be approximately 25% greater than the other three. There are alternative ways of splitting the Island into four districts but not without dividing other parishes as well as St Peter Port and the Committee does not favour doing that.

19.2 On the continuum of electoral systems, Option D, like Option C, sits somewhere between island-wide voting for all Deputies and the present seven districts. It would allow each elector to have an influence over approximately one-quarter of the seats in the States – a substantially higher proportion than at present – while retaining most of the advantages of the present system. It would also retain the concept of a General Election where all seats are elected on one day once every four years rather than requiring a portion of seats to be elected at more frequent intervals. It is, in effect, an alternative way of increasing the proportion of seats over which each elector has some influence while providing for elections with an obviously practicable number of candidates.

19.3 For many years St Peter Port, when it was one electoral district, had a similar number of electors and a similar number of seats as the four electoral districts would have in Option D. There were no indications that an electoral district of that size was unpopular or impracticable. Clearly four districts of such a size would make it easier

for a close connection to be maintained between electors and ‘their’ Deputies than would be the case if there were two districts or one single district, but some people will feel that any increase in the size of electoral districts risks creating too much distance between the electorate and the elected.

- 19.4 Perhaps the single greatest disadvantage of Option D is that it would not fully satisfy either those people who favour electing all deputies on an island-wide basis or those people who favour retaining the present seven, smaller electoral districts. If those two groups of people together comprise a clear majority of the Island, Option D is likely to prove unpopular. However, those two groups of people have objectives which are plainly mutually contradictory and it may be that a not insubstantial portion of the electorate would be content to find a compromise solution.
- 19.5 Option D would represent further evolution in the consolidation of electoral districts – seven districts having been created from the ten parochial constituencies in 2004 – without taking the more radical step of reducing the number of districts to two or even one. Option D would go some way towards satisfying the demands of electors who want an influence over more Deputies’ seats but the basic character of elections would probably be similar to what Guernsey has been used to for many years.
- 19.6 Some voters may not appreciate the merging for electoral purposes of parishes which had for decades operated as their own electoral districts, but in 2004 this concern was felt not to be sufficient to prevent the merging of six parishes into two electoral districts and the Committee is aware of no great demand to divide those electoral districts and return to ten districts strictly along parochial lines. It may be that some electors whose parishes were merged for electoral purposes in 2004 would not appreciate further reconfiguration of their electoral districts, although doubtless they would soon become accustomed to the new districts, as they did in 2004. It should be noted that in many jurisdictions constituency boundaries are frequently redrawn from one election to the next.
- 19.7 It should also be noted that population shifts around the Island mean there is no guarantee that the present electoral districts can be maintained in the long-term unless electors are prepared to return to the days when there was material over-representation of some parts of the Island and material under-representation of others. Put simply, constituency or district boundaries in Guernsey, as elsewhere, are always subject to change unless the Island is turned into one single district.
- 19.8 A diligent candidate with sufficient time available during the day could certainly canvass the majority of a district of the size envisaged in Option D. Some members of the Committee believe that the possibility of an elector canvassing the whole of his or her district would be lost under Option D, but other members who have canvassed whole districts are of the opinion that candidates could conceivably canvass all of their electors, possibly with a slight extension to the campaign period.

- 19.9 It is possible that traditional hustings meetings would continue at which all candidates could be present answering questions on the same occasion – as was the case in St Peter Port when it was a single district – although the likely increase in the number of candidates (perhaps half again as many candidates who tend to stand in the present, smaller districts) would no doubt concern those people who feel that traditional hustings meetings are already somewhat unwieldy with perhaps around a dozen candidates each answering the same questions by rotation. An alternative would be for candidates to be split into two batches, which would mean that the opportunity would be lost to compare all candidates against each other on the same occasion, as is the case in the present system, but electors who wished to hear from all their candidates in the hustings format would need to attend only two such meetings rather than the many more meetings which may be necessary if the hustings format was to be retained in the island-wide system in which all deputies would be elected from one district on one day.
- 19.10 If drop-in sessions were held under Option D, an elector could conceivably speak individually to all of his or her candidates, though clearly that would take longer than it does at present and it may be possible only if districts held multiple sessions and the elector was prepared to attend more than one.
- 19.11 Electors would have more manifestos to read than at present but fewer than in some of the other options recommended for inclusion on the ballot paper at the referendum. Whether increasing the number of seats and candidates in a district by perhaps around one-half would place too great a burden on electors to read manifestos is a matter of judgement. Similarly, voting and counting would take longer than at present but less time than in some of the other options, but it is felt that the logistics of running polling stations and counting votes would not be materially different from at present.
- 19.12 Option D would require no transitional provisions. All members could be elected under this system from the next General Election in June, 2020.

Districts	Total Population per district	Pure division	Votes per elector
1. – St Peter Port (South) and St Martin	15,038	9.1	9
2. – St Peter Port (North), St Andrew and Forest	14,349	8.7	9
3. – Vale (all) and St Sampson (all)	18,472	11.2	11
4. – Castel, St Saviour, St Pierre du Bois and Torteval	14,600	8.9	9

## Section 20: Option E

**20** *In Option E all deputies would be elected for one island-wide constituency. One-third of seats (approximately 12 to 13 seats) would be elected every two years. All electors would have as many votes as there are seats to elect. Every candidate would stand to be elected by the whole Island. Every elector, regardless of where he or she lives, would be free to choose from the entire list of candidates. All deputies would serve for a term of six years.*

20.1 Option E is 'full' island-wide voting: every Deputy would be elected on an island-wide basis. However, it overcomes, or at least mitigates, many of the logistical obstacles associated with Option A. In particular it provides for 'full' island-wide voting without the need for elections involving potentially impracticable numbers of seats, votes and candidates. Supporters are likely to argue that, if in the future all Deputies are to be elected on an island-wide basis, the sort of electoral system set out in Option E is the most practicable way of achieving that.

20.2 The Committee considered variants of this 'rolling' island-wide electoral system: for example, the election of one-half of seats (e.g. 19 seats) every two years with all Deputies serving for a term of four years. Option E is recommended for inclusion on the ballot paper at the referendum largely because of the point in the preceding paragraph – it overcomes, or at least mitigates, many of the logistical obstacles associated with Option A – and is therefore sufficiently different from Option A, whereas electing one-half of seats (e.g. 19 seats) every two years would overcome none of the logistical obstacles associated with Option A and would not be sufficiently distinct to add much to the range of choice available to voters in the referendum.

20.3 Some voters would prefer to go to the polls every four years. Some voters would welcome the opportunity which Option E would provide to renew the membership of the States biennially. It is possible that some potential candidates who would be happy to commit to serving in the Assembly for four years would be less enthusiastic about committing to a six-year term.

20.4 Holding elections for one-third of the Assembly every two years would provide the States with more continuity because the potential for turnover in membership at each election would be much reduced. Improving the balance between continuity and renewal could be a significant advantage, particularly if it addressed the lacuna in activity which has tended to affect each newly-elected Assembly for several months since General Elections in their full sense were introduced in 2004. On the other hand there may be fears that elections every two years would prove disruptive, albeit this could be greatly limited by only one-third of seats (rather than one-half of seats, as proposed in Option C) being involved in each electoral cycle. Opponents of Option E may fear that a portion of the States would be in 'election mode' more frequently than is the case at present, but equally at all times two-thirds of the States would not be involved in the next electoral cycle and indeed there

would never be a time, as there is at present for several months at either end of a States' term, when the whole Assembly has either just been elected or is soon to face another election.

- 20.5 The section of the policy letter on Option A identified a concern that it would increase the likelihood of candidates being elected with the support of voters who were extremely loyal but very few in number. Option E significantly reduces this risk because the average voter would be much more likely to use a greater proportion of 12 or 13 votes than of 38 votes.
- 20.6 There is a convention that the States do not meet after nominations for election have opened in order that serving members cannot use the Assembly as a platform from which to electioneer. At present that period when the States do not meet – which lasts about six weeks – occurs once every four years. If the convention was to be maintained, in Option E that period when the States do not meet would occur once every two years. This could be accommodated quite easily, but the calendar for States' Meetings would obviously need to be adjusted slightly.
- 20.7 Option E would go a long way towards addressing the concerns about electing all members of the States in one single district on one day (i.e. Option A) which were raised by the Electoral Reform Society and which were reproduced at paragraph 16.2.
- 20.8 Option E would be as effective as Option A at responding to the arguments which tend to be advanced in favour of every Deputy being elected on an island-wide basis. Some people argue that it would strengthen democracy in the Island. Certainly it would enable every elector to have some influence over every seat in the States, which in the absence of political parties is seen by some people as the best way of securing a legitimate democratic mandate for the whole of the States. The vast majority of propositions which go before the States affect the whole Island and so it is understandable that some electors wish to have an influence over every seat rather than over only one-sixth or one-seventh of the Assembly, as is the case at present. Proponents of Option E believe that government would be improved by making every Deputy, in theory at least, electorally accountable to every elector.
- 20.9 While it seeks to overcome or limit some of the practicable difficulties associated with island-wide voting, of course Option E carries the other disadvantages of island-wide voting which concern opponents of such a system. Allowing every elector to have some influence over every seat in the States necessarily means that the weight of each individual vote would diminish. The fear would remain of disproportionately favouring well-known candidates, including sitting members of the States – it could be argued that the experience of Senatorial elections in Jersey demonstrates that this concern is not without foundation.

- 20.10 No candidate could canvass all or even most of the Island in an election campaign lasting only a few weeks and this would be an unwelcome development for electors who greatly value the opportunity to speak on their doorstep to as many of their candidates as possible. For this reason it may be – but it is by no means certain – that introducing Option E would encourage the formation of political parties or electoral alliances to assist candidates who fear being unable properly to promote themselves and their policies as just one among perhaps 70, 80 or 90 others, although some of the other potential catalysts for parties or alliances which are evident in Option A are less evident in Option E.
- 20.11 It can safely be assumed that there would be many fewer candidates standing at each election with ‘rolling’ island-wide elections, i.e. Option E, than there would be under single-election island-wide elections, i.e. Option A, but it cannot necessarily be assumed that it would be as few as a third each time – it would depend how many unsuccessful candidates chose to re-stand at two-year intervals. It is highly likely that there would still be a significant increase in the number of manifestos which every elector would be required to read. Some electors would find this a daunting prospect and weighing up the merits of each manifesto against all the others could be challenging, though obviously much less so than under Option A. Other electors would consider this acceptable in order to be able to have some influence over every seat in the States.
- 20.12 Traditional hustings meetings – in the sense of one occasion when it is possible for an elector to compare all candidates against each other when answering the same questions without notice – would not be viable under Option E. Hustings meetings could still be held, but if so candidates would be split into batches – for example, if there were 30 candidates, there could be three hustings meetings held on three different occasions each featuring ten candidates.
- 20.13 The general observations made in preceding sections about drop-in sessions would apply equally to Option E. If drop-in sessions were held under Option E, an elector could conceivably speak individually to all of his or her candidates, though clearly that would take longer than it does at present and it would undoubtedly require multiple sessions to be held and the elector would need to attend on perhaps two or three occasions.
- 20.14 Option E may lend itself to the introduction, or rather re-introduction, of electing some or all seats on States’ Committees more frequently than once every four years. The Committee’s predecessors consulted members of previous States on this matter and found those in favour and those against to be broadly in balance.
- 20.15 For obvious reasons it would not be possible immediately to implement Option E in its final form. Therefore, transitional arrangements would be required. One possibility would be to have single-election island-wide voting for one General Election only in 2020 and then commence biennial elections in 2022. Another possibility would be to retain the present electoral districts for the next General

Election in 2020 and then commence biennial elections in 2022. The transitional arrangements would need to be agreed by the States if Option E won the referendum. At the same time the States would need to decide whether to retain 38 deputies with some biennial elections being for 12 seats and some for 13 seats or to have 39 deputies with 13 seats being elected every two years or 36 deputies with 12 seats being elected every two years.

Districts	Total Population per district	Number of seats	Votes per elector at each election
1. – All parts and areas of Guernsey, Herm and Jethou	62,723	38	12 or 13

## 21 Alderney

- 21.1 Between 1994 and 2000, when Conseillers were elected by the people, the island of Alderney was also included in the single “Bailiwick-wide” constituency. The Committee is not proposing that this should happen now if the outcome of the referendum lead to the introduction of island-wide voting systems (i.e. Options A or E).
- 21.2 Between 1948 and 1994 Conseillers were elected by the States of Election and not by the people. For the purpose of electing Conseillers (but not Jurats), the States of Election comprised the various representatives from Guernsey and also four representatives from Alderney. Having had such an input, albeit indirectly, into the election of “old-style” Conseillers, it was considered necessary to maintain the right of the Alderney electors to participate in the election of “new-style” Conseillers. That right was ended in 2000 when the office of Conseiller was abolished. The Committee does not believe that it should now be reinstated. When the office of Conseiller was abolished all Members of the States became representatives of a specific part of the Bailiwick, be that several parishes, a parish, part of St Peter Port or the island of Alderney. There are two Alderney Representatives in the States who play a full and active role in proceedings. The two Representatives represent 5% of the elected Members of the States of Guernsey whereas the population of Alderney is about 3% of the population of Guernsey and Alderney.
- 21.3 The Committee believes that, even if the electoral system changes and there is just one Guernsey district, Alderney’s representation should nevertheless remain distinct to ensure that the northern island’s interests are properly represented in the States as required by the Reform Law. The alternative would be to abolish the office of Alderney Representative and allow Alderney to join what would become a single Bailiwick-wide jurisdiction, but this could never guarantee the proper representation of Alderney’s interests.

- 21.4 The Committee wrote to the States of Alderney on the 26<sup>th</sup> January, 2017 inviting them to advise of their preference for the representation of their island in the States. At the time of submission of this policy letter no response had been received.

## **22 Compliance with Rule 4**

- 22.1 Rule 4 of the Rules of Procedure of the States of Deliberation and their Committees sets out the information which must be included in, or appended to, motions laid before the States.
- 22.2 In accordance with Rule 4(1), the Propositions – and indeed more than one draft of the policy letter – have been submitted to Her Majesty’s Procureur for advice on any legal or constitutional implications. She has advised that there is no reason in law why the Propositions should not to be put into effect.
- 22.3 In accordance with Rule 4(2), the Committee requests that the Propositions be considered by the States at their Meeting which starts on the 21<sup>st</sup> of June, 2017. When the Policy & Resources Committee and the States consider Schedules for future States’ business, the Committee requests that they take account of the points made in paragraph 11.5 of this policy letter which support the case for it to be considered by the States on the 21<sup>st</sup> of June.
- 22.4 In accordance with Rule 4(3), the Committee has included Propositions which request the States to approve maximum funding of £159,000, including a contingency sum of £5,000, in order to fund the holding of a well-organised and credible referendum. Further details about resources are provided in paragraphs 22.9 to 22.11 below.
- 22.5 In accordance with Rule 4(4), it is confirmed that the Committee is unanimous in recommending that the States approve Propositions 1, 2 and 4 to 10 inclusive on P. 2017/49 which would mean that Proposition 3 would fall automatically.
- 22.6 In accordance with Rule 4(5), the Propositions relate to the duties of the Committee *“to advise the States and to develop and implement policies in relation to the constitution...of the States of Deliberation [and]...elections to the office of People’s Deputy”* and also fulfil relevant Resolutions made by the States in 2016.
- 22.7 Also in accordance with Rule 4(5), the Committee consulted the following: the Committee *for* Home Affairs in relation to the Electoral Roll, initially at a meeting of the two Committees on the 20<sup>th</sup> February, 2017 and subsequently in correspondence; the Registrar-General of Electors on several matters, which included sending him various versions of the full policy letter as it developed; the President and senior officers of the Policy & Resources Committee in relation to resources; parish douzaines in relation to the arrangements for the day of the referendum and in relation to options A to E; the Electoral Commission in the UK;



and, as explained in the preceding section, the States of Alderney. The Committee thanks all other Committees and officers whose advice has assisted in the drafting of this policy letter.

- 22.8 The holding of a referendum is not to be undertaken casually or impulsively, perhaps especially so for a jurisdiction, like Guernsey, with no previous experience of referendums. All aspects of the referendum must meet accepted democratic principles; the terms of the referendum must be very clear in advance; and particular care must be taken to ensure that eligible voters have every opportunity freely to express their views on the subject matter of the referendum. These essential objectives cannot be met without incurring some expenditure.
- 22.9 When the referendum was first considered early in 2016 there were some estimates that it could cost up to £400,000. However, as the Committee's predecessor advised at the time, most of these costs could be avoided if the existing Electoral Roll was used. The Committee *for* Home Affairs, which has responsibility for policy in relation to the Roll, and the Registrar-General of Electors support the use of the existing Roll for the referendum. There would still be some cost to encouraging people to enrol who were not enrolled already and to processing such applications, but this would be a fraction of the cost of creating a new Electoral Roll from scratch. The Committee repeats its thanks to the Committee *for* Home Affairs and the Registrar-General of Electors for what they have agreed to do to update the existing Roll ahead of the referendum.
- 22.10 The Committee estimates that the basic cost of preparing for and running the referendum will be no greater than £64,000. This figure has been worked out after analysis of costs incurred in relation to recent General Elections. It includes efforts to promote enrolment, adding new voters to the Electoral Roll, printing of voting papers, administering postal voting, the distribution to voters of information about the question they are being asked, administration leading up to and during polling day (including reimbursement of parish expenses) and maintaining an internet presence. This figure includes a sum of £25,000 to be used for publicity about the options A to E. This money, or at least some of it, will be spent by campaign groups if the States agree to the Committee's proposal that they should be permitted and allowed to spend a modest sum of public money (the exact grant and any conditions attached to it would be set out in the referendum legislation) or, if not, by the States themselves.
- 22.11 Staff costs associated with preparing for and running the referendum have been calculated as up to £90,000. The anticipated split of the total sum of £159,000, including contingencies, between 2017 and 2018 is £31,000 and £128,000 respectively. This figure is based largely on information provided by senior States' officers. The Committee does not have a budget of its own – some years ago its predecessors agreed to a proposal from the former Treasury & Resources Department to incorporate its budget within that of the Royal Court. The Committee has been advised to include this figure for staff costs in the policy letter in case there

is a need to pay staff who do not currently work for the States either to work on the referendum project themselves or to provide cover for those seconded to work on it. It is not known at this stage how much of this sum will actually need to be spent. The Committee questions whether staff costs need to be as high as estimated, but without a budget of its own and with only 1.5 FTE the Committee acknowledges that the referendum will need to be resourced from elsewhere in the States and has therefore included a budget request largely as advised.

## **23 Alternative Proposition**

- 23.1 It should be noted that Propositions 2 and 3 are alternatives. For the reasons set out in this policy letter, the Committee believes that the States should resolve to hold a multi-option referendum to determine Guernsey's electoral system. Nevertheless, it is aware that some Members of the States believe that, if there is to be a referendum, voters should be asked their opinion on one electoral system only: all 38 deputies being elected on one day in a single election from a single district. If those Members wish to reject the arguments set out in this policy letter and limit the choice given to the electorate in the referendum to one option only then the Committee has set out in Proposition 3 how that can be achieved.

Yours faithfully,

Deputy M. J. Fallaize  
President

Deputy P. J. Roffey  
Vice-President

Deputy M. H. Dorey  
Deputy M. K. Le Clerc  
Deputy H. L. de Sausmarez

## List of appendices

Appendix 1 – other electoral systems

Appendix 2 – the suggested referendum ballot slip

Appendix 3.1 – sample ballot slip for option A

Appendix 3.2 – sample ballot slip for option B

Appendix 3.3 – sample ballot slip for option C

Appendix 3.4 – sample ballot slip for option D

Appendix 3.5 – sample ballot slip for option E

Appendix 4 – political parties

## Appendix 1

### **Other electoral systems**

- 1 The Committee sets out below several electoral systems which it considered and the reasons why they are not recommended for inclusion on the ballot paper at the referendum.

### **A different number of districts**

- 2 The Committee is recommending including on the ballot paper options for one, two, four and seven districts respectively.
- 3 The Committee detects no support for increasing the number of districts to more than seven, which could potentially reverse some of the reforms to boundaries which were made in 2004 or, in order to prevent over-representation in some parts of the Island and under-representation in other parts, require more parishes to be divided into separate electoral districts.
- 4 Reducing the number of districts to five or six would appear to yield few of the benefits, as perceived by some people, of rationalising districts and is insufficiently different from Options B and D to justify inclusion on the ballot paper.
- 5 The three tables below illustrate three different ways of dividing the Island into three electoral districts. The Committee is not recommending including any of them on the ballot paper because Option D – for four districts, rather than three – provide for similar outcomes but allow a more logical drawing of electoral boundaries.

Districts	Total Population per district	Pure Votes	Actual Votes
1. St Peter Port South, St Martin, Forest, St Pierre du Bois and Torteval	19,735	12.0	12
2. Vale, Castel and St Saviour	21,012	12.8	13
3. St Peter Port North, St Sampson and St Andrew	21,726	13.2	13

A slight variation on the above is to move St Andrew's parish into another district to give another option for a three-district model, namely:

Districts	Total Population per district	Pure seats	Actual votes
1. St Peter Port (North) and St Sampson	19,386	11.8	12
2. Vale, Castel and St Saviour	21,012	12.8	13
3. St Peter Port (South), St Martin, Forest, St Andrew, St Pierre du Bois, Torteval	22,075	13.4	13

Another option for a three-district model is the following:

Districts	Total Population per district	Pure Votes	Actual Votes
1. St Peter Port South, St Martin, Forest, St Saviour, St Pierre du Bois and Torteval	22,484	13.7	14
2. St Sampsons, Vale	18,472	11.2	11
3. St Peter Port North, Castel and St Andrew	21,517	13.1	13

If current internal population movements continue and new developments are concentrated in the north of the Island then this option may need to be introduced in future, if a three-district model were adopted.

**38 island-wide Deputies – half elected every two years; all Deputies serving a four-year term**

- 6 This is a variation on Option E. It was put before the States and rejected as recently as 2011. It would bring about elections every two years – but, unlike Option E, without addressing any of the logistical challenges associated with 'full' island-wide voting, in particular the likely number of candidates, seats and votes. Put simply, if the electorate is to be asked every two years to elect 19 candidates from a list of perhaps 50, as may well be the case under this model, then the electorate might as well be asked to elect 38 candidates from a list of perhaps 70 to 90 without the need to go to the polls biennially.

**38 island-wide Deputies – half elected every two years; all Deputies serving a six-year term**

- 7 This is another variation on Option E. In effect it would mean the election of the whole States on the same basis as Conseillers were elected between 1994 and 2000, i.e. six-year terms with half elected every three years. It may be that some people would prefer elections every three years rather than every two. However, this model would require all Deputies' terms of office to last six years, which would be seen by some people as a disadvantage – but unlike Option E, without addressing any of the logistical challenges associated with 'full' island-wide voting, in particular the likely number of candidates, seats and votes.
- 8 Clearly there are some people in the Island who wish to elect all Deputies on an island-wide basis. Option A would allow them to do so in one election on a single day. Option E, by substantially reducing the number of candidates, seats and votes at each election, would allow them to do so in a way which overcomes perhaps the single-greatest logistical challenges of Option A. Therefore the Committee is clear that Options A and E are the two 'full' island-wide voting models which should be included on the ballot paper at the referendum.

**Island-wide/district hybrid system**

- 9 The Committee considered models which would allow for single-election island-wide voting but also remove the risk which some people fear of their district being left without adequate representation. The succeeding paragraphs describe such an electoral system.
- 10 The election itself would be on a single-election island-wide basis: that is, all 38 Members would be elected on one day for the same term of office. Each voter would have 38 votes and could vote for any candidate. Once voting had taken place the votes would be counted on a district basis – i.e. votes cast by residents of that district for candidates resident in or representing that district, as with the current system – with no amalgamation of the votes cast. In each district, the candidate polling the highest number of votes would be elected automatically and these seven candidates would therefore not be included in the second stage of the count.
- 11 The second stage of the count would be amalgamated across all districts and the total number of votes received by each remaining candidate from across all districts would be tallied. The remaining 31 seats would be filled by the candidates polling the highest number of votes in this second stage amalgamated count.
- 12 This electoral system would ensure that none of the current electoral districts was left wholly unrepresented in the States, while also fully facilitating "full" island-wide voting. Under Option A it is theoretically possible (albeit most unlikely) that every single Member could be a resident of just one district. Although it is accepted that all Members are willing to and do represent the interests of all parts of the Island

and champion the causes of individuals wherever they might live, many people like having a particular Member or Members to whom they feel a closer affinity because they represent their specific area.

- 13 This system would ensure a continuation of some form of district representation in the States while also ensuring that voters could vote for any candidate in any part of the Island.
- 14 It would encourage candidates to undertake traditional door-to-door canvassing on a district basis and it would also enable hustings in their current format to continue. It may encourage candidates to stand who have a strong connection to their local community but are not more widely well-known, as they may perceive this system to give them a better chance of success than Option A, which is likely to favour incumbents and other well-known personalities.
- 15 As with Option A, this system would still require voters to look through the manifestos of all candidates across the Island. Voters would still also have to decide on up to 38 candidates. However, this option would not have the problems associated with either the Conseiller-type system or the Douzaine representative system set out below, such as candidates having to choose between standing in their district or island-wide, and expectations of more senior positions going to island-wide Deputies.
- 16 The counting process would be more complicated than in Option A because there would be two discrete stages. Were this option to be progressed, the Committee would suggest that voters would be able to vote only in their own district's polling stations, even though the candidates would be the same across the Island, because the first stage of the count would be a district count. Otherwise, the logistical complications could cause confusion and unnecessary expense.
- 17 The Committee is not recommending this electoral system for inclusion on the ballot paper at the referendum because it is concerned about the logic of trying to retain electoral districts while requiring all candidates and voters to participate in an island-wide election.

**Some Members elected island-wide, others by district**

- 18 This sort of electoral system would introduce an element of island-wide voting while retaining district representation. Conceptually this would be a return to the period 1994 to 2000. At that time twelve Conseillers were elected on an island-wide basis and 33 deputies were elected in electoral districts (parishes).
- 19 The exact proportion of island-wide and district seats would need to be determined. Clearly the minimum number of district Deputies would need to be seven in order for each of the districts to elect one – and in that case there would be 31 island-wide deputies. Or around half the States could be elected island-wide and around half in

districts. Or there could be more district Deputies than island-wide Deputies, although there would seem to be little point in introducing island-wide elections for fewer than, say, eight to ten seats. The advantages and disadvantages of island-wide and district elections were explored in sections 16 to 20 of this policy letter and many of them apply to the various permutations for this sort of combined island-wide/district electoral system depending on the number of seats to be reserved for each of the two categories of Deputy.

- 20 There are several reasons why the Committee does not recommend that such an electoral system be included among the Options A to E on the ballot paper at the referendum.
- 21 Creating two classes of States' Member would be detrimental to good government. Of course, after a General Election, some Members are elected to more senior offices, but all Members are elected to the States as equals. Creating different classes of Member could hardly fail to be divisive. This problem would doubtless be compounded by the inevitable conflation, which the present electoral system largely avoids, of electoral popularity and suitability for senior office – indeed this very problem was felt to be one of the principal disadvantages of the popularly-elected office of Conseiller during its short-lived existence of six years between 1994 and 2000.
- 22 When the public had the opportunity to vote for some island-wide and some parish representation, turnout at such elections was not terribly impressive. In 1994, in the first island-wide election for Conseillers, 17,080 people voted. In 1997, in the second and last island-wide election for Conseillers, only 11,521 people voted whereas in the Parish Deputies' election a month later 14,812 people voted. At last year's General Election, when of course there was only one class of Member to be elected (and all in districts), 21,803 people voted. In short, the experiment with two classes of Member both elected by the people proved was, based on the turnout figures, no more popular than it was enduring.
- 23 In this context it may be instructive to consider the experience in Jersey, which is one of very few parliaments to have some jurisdiction-wide members and some district members. Jersey held a referendum on electoral reform four years ago – and more than 80% of those who turned out cast first preference votes for options which did not include a combination of some members elected in districts and some elected island-wide.
- 24 Since the abolition of the office of Conseiller in 2000, three of the past four States' terms have debated proposals to reintroduce an electoral system which would provide for some district Deputies and some island-wide Deputies and on each occasion the proposals have been firmly rejected.



- 25 It would be necessary to determine whether island-wide deputies and district deputies should be elected on the same day or on different days. Both models create different but significant problems.
- 26 Holding the elections on the same day could result in a good candidate not succeeding in, say, the island-wide election when he or she might well have succeeded in a district election. In addition, potential candidates for senior office who have a strong base of support in their own districts may be discouraged from seeking election island-wide, which would be in conflict with the public perception which is bound to be created that the island-wide Deputies are more senior than the district deputies and should therefore hold the senior offices.
- 27 Holding elections on different days – say, for district Deputies a few weeks after island-wide deputies – would significantly extend the election period during which the States’ Assembly would be inactive. It could also create the impression that candidates who fail to secure election have another, slightly easier route to election a few weeks later. In addition, setting up two election campaign periods to run more or less one after the other and asking people to turn out twice in, say, four to six weeks to vote for different classes of States’ Member would risk creating voter fatigue.

#### **“Golden” votes**

- 28 Another possible voting system is to give each voter a number of “golden” votes, in addition to the ones they have for their district. Indeed this system was debated and rejected by the previous States.
- 29 The Island would continue to be split into a number of districts, currently seven. Each voter would have the same number of “ordinary” votes as there are seats in the district, currently either five or six, and they would cast those in the normal way. Voters would also be able to cast votes for candidates seeking election in any other electoral district as each voter would also have a number of so-called “golden votes” which could be cast in favour of any candidate standing in another district.
- 30 This would require each voter to be given either one ballot slip containing two separate lists or two separate ballot slips, in order to distinguish between the candidates in that voter’s district and the candidates in all the other districts.
- 31 Some Deputies would be elected because of the number of ordinary, district-only votes which they obtained while others would be elected with the assistance of golden votes obtained from voters in other districts.
- 32 While perhaps superficially attractive, this model has two significant weaknesses.
- 33 First, because all candidates would in effect be standing on an island-wide basis, this model incorporates all the practical challenges associated with ‘full’ island-wide

voting as set out in Option A – e.g. in relation to canvassing, hustings, number of manifestos and number of candidates – without delivering the main advantage of ‘full’ island-wide voting, which is to allow each voter to have some influence over every seat in the States.

- 34 Second, this model risks an outcome whereby a candidate who failed to obtain enough district-only votes to be elected is elected for that district anyway because of the number of golden votes he or she secured from electors in other districts.

#### **Alternative four-district models**

- 35 Option D, which the Committee recommends for inclusion on the ballot paper at the referendum, divides the Island into four electoral districts. The district boundaries preferred by the Committee are set out in paragraph 19.1 of this policy letter. The Committee did consider alternative ways of dividing the Island into four districts and these are set out in the tables below.

Districts	Total Population per district	Pure Votes	Actual Votes
1. St Peter Port (North and South)	18,798	11.4	11
2. St Martin, Forest, St Saviour, St Pierre du Bois and Torteval	14,020	8.5	9
3. Clos du Valle and St Sampson	14,791	9.0	9
4. St Andrew, Castel and Vingtaine de l’Epine	14,933	9.1	9

This produces a similar split to the option set out in option D but requires the Vale parish to be split between two electoral districts. It is, therefore, not recommended.

#### **4 Districts**

Districts	Total Population per district	Pure Votes	Actual Votes
1. St Peter Port (South), St Martin, Forest	16,616	10.1	10
2. St Peter Port (North), Vingtaine de l’Epine and St Andrew	16,466	10.0	10
3. Clos du Valle and St Sampson	14,791	9.0	9
4. Castel, St Saviour, St Pierre du Bois and Torteval	14,600	8.9	9

Although this option gives a more even distribution of seats among the districts, the Committee does not propose that it should be adopted in the event of a move to a four-district electoral system because it also requires the Vale parish to be split across two electoral districts.

REFERENDUM ON THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IN GUERNSEY

Wednesday xx<sup>th</sup> June, 2018



REFERENDUM ON THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM

**Which of the following options should be used to elect Deputies?**

Number the boxes from 1 to 5 in the order of your preference. 1 is your first preference and you must start your numbering at 1. You do not need to use all of your 5 choices.

☐

**Option A**

- 1 island-wide electoral district
- Each voter would have 38 votes at each election
- Each Deputy would serve for 4 years
- An election would be held every 4 years for all Deputies at once

☐

**Option B**

- 7 electoral districts
- Each voter would have 5 or 6 votes at each election
- Each Deputy would serve for 4 years
- An election would be held every 4 years for all Deputies at once

☐

**Option C**

- 2 electoral districts
- Each voter would have 9 or 10 votes at each election
- Each Deputy would serve for 4 years
- An election would be held every 2 years for half of Deputies each time

☐

**Option D**

- 4 electoral districts
- Each voter would have between 9 and 11 votes at each election
- Each Deputy would serve for 4 years
- An election would be held every 4 years for all Deputies at once

☐

**Option E**

- 1 island-wide electoral district
- Each voter would have 12 or 13 votes at each election
- Each Deputy would serve for 6 years
- An election would be held every 2 years for a third of Deputies each time

GENERAL ELECTION OF PEOPLE’S DEPUTIES    xx<sup>th</sup> June, 2020



GENERAL ELECTION OF PEOPLE’S DEPUTIES

xx<sup>th</sup> June, 2020    38 PEOPLE’S DEPUTIES

Put X here

ADAM, Alexander Hunter	
ARCHER, Gregory John <i>commonly known as Greg</i>	
BEAUMONT, Michael	
BREBAN, Brian David	
BREHAUT, Barry Leslie	
BROUARD, Alvord Henry <i>commonly known as Al</i>	
BURFORD, Yvonne	
BUSH, Timothy Alan Carey	
COLLINS, Garry Michael	
DE LA MARE, Simon John	
DE LISLE, David de Garis	
DE SAUSMAREZ, Helen Lindsay <i>commonly known as Lindsay</i>	
DOREY, Mark Hirzel	
DUDLEY-OWEN, Andrea Catherine	
DUQUEMIN, Darren James	
FALLAIZE, Matthew James	
FERBRACHE, Peter Terence Richard	
FLOUQUET, Bernard Marcel	
FORMAN, Neil Edward	
GALLIENNE, Leon Roy	
GARRETT, Michael Guy Gordon	
GOLLOP, John Alfred Bannerman	
GRAHAM, Richard Harold, LVO, MBE	
GREEN, Christopher James	
HADLEY, Michael Peter James	
HALKER, John	

Put X here

HOCKEY, Trevor Brian	
INDER, Neil Richard	
JAMES, Sandra Anne, MBE	
KRUZE, Lilita	
KUTTELWASCHER, Jan	
LANGLOIS, Shane Lenfestey	
LEADBEATER, Marc Paul	
LE BRUN, Ross John	
LE CLERC, Michelle Karen	
LE CONTE, Russell Ian Carrington	
LE PELLE, Paul Raymond	
LE PREVOST, Robin Andrew	
LE TOCQ, Jonathan Paul	
LOWE, Mary May	
LOWE, Richard William <i>commonly known as Rick</i>	
MAINDONALD, Samantha Jane	
MATTHEWS, Robert Rhoderick	
MCLEAN, Raymond <i>commonly known as Marshall, Ray</i>	
M <sup>C</sup> MANUS, Caroline Jane	
MEERVELD, Carl Peter	
MERRETT, Jennifer Sue	
MOONEY, Joseph Ignatius <i>commonly known as Joe</i>	
NEWMAN, William Edward	
O’HARA, Michael George	
OLIVER, Victoria Sarah	
PAGLIARONE, Lucia Faith	
PAINT, Barry John Edward	

Put X here

PARKINSON, Charles Nigel Kennedy	
PETIT, Martin John	
PROUT, Stephen Michael	
PROW, Robert George <i>commonly known as Rob</i>	
QUERIPEL, Laurie Bryn	
QUERIPEL, Lester Carlson	
RIHOY, Ivan Frederick	
ROFFEY, Peter John	
ROUSSEL, Martyn Roy	
SHEPHERD, Neil	
SILLARS, Robert William	
SOLWAY, Karen Joy	
SOULSBY, Heidi Jean Renée	
SMITHIES, Jeremy Charles Stewart Fulford	
STEPHENS, Tania Jane <i>commonly known as Jane</i>	
STEWART, Kevin Andrew	
ST. PIER, Gavin Anthony	
TINDALL, Dawn Angela	
TITMUSS, John Austin	
TOOLEY, Rhian Helen	
TROTT, Lyndon Sean	
WEBBER, Anthony David Canivet <i>commonly known as Tony</i>	
WILKIE, Arrun Michael	
YERBY, Emilie Anna	

GENERAL ELECTION OF PEOPLE’S DEPUTIES xx<sup>th</sup> June, 2020

**Electoral District of St Sampson**



**Electoral District of  
ST SAMPSON**

**xx<sup>th</sup> June, 2020**

**6 PEOPLE’S DEPUTIES**

**Put X here**

BEAUMONT, Michael	
LE PELLE, Paul Raymond	
MAINDONALD, Samantha Jane	
MEERVELD, Carl Peter	
MERRETT, Jennifer Sue	
ROUSSEL, Martyn Roy	
SOLWAY, Karen Joy	
ST PIER, Gavin Anthony	
STEPHENS, Tania Jane	
STEWART, Kevin Andrew	
TROTT, Lyndon Sean	
WEBBER, Anthony David Canivet <i>commonly known as Tony</i>	

GENERAL ELECTION OF PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES xx<sup>th</sup> June, 2020



**GENERAL ELECTION OF PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES**

xx<sup>th</sup> June, 2020    9 PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES

DISTRICT 1

Vale, St Sampson, St Peter Port (North) & St Andrew

**Put X here**

ADAM, Alexander Hunter	
ARCHER, Gregory John <i>commonly known as Greg</i>	
BEAUMONT, Michael	
BREBAN, Brian David	
BREHAUT, Barry Leslie	
BROUARD, Alvord Henry <i>commonly known as Al</i>	
BURFORD, Yvonne	
BUSH, Timothy Alan Carey	
COLLINS, Garry Michael	
DE LA MARE, Simon John	
DE LISLE, David de Garis	

**Put X here**

DE SAUSMAREZ, Helen Lindsay <i>commonly known as Lindsay</i>	
DOREY, Mark Hirzel	
DUDLEY-OWEN, Andrea Catherine	
DUQUEMIN, Darren James	
FALLAIZE, Matthew James	
FERBRACHE, Peter Terence Richard	
FLOUQUET, Bernard Marcel	
FORMAN, Neil Edward	
GALLIENNE, Leon Roy	
GARRETT, Michael Guy Gordon	
GOLLOP, John Alfred Bannerman	

GENERAL ELECTION OF PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES xx<sup>th</sup> June, 2020



**GENERAL ELECTION OF PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES**

xx<sup>th</sup> June, 2020      10 PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES

DISTRICT 1

St Peter Port (South) & St Martin

**Put X here**

LE CONTE, Russell Ian Carrington	
LE TOCQ, Jonathan Paul	
LOWE, Mary May	
MATTHEWS, Robert Rhoderick	
MCLEAN, Raymond <i>commonly known as</i> Marshall, Ray	
MERRETT, Jennifer Sue	
MOONEY, Joseph Ignatius <i>commonly known as Joe</i>	
OLIVER, Victoria Sarah	
PAGLIARONE, Lucia Faith	
PETIT, Martin John	

**Put X here**

PROUT, Stephen Michael	
QUERIPEL, Lester Carlson	
RIHOY, Ivan Frederick	
SHEPHERD, Neil	
SILLARS, Robert William	
SMITHIES, Jeremy Charles Stewart Fulford	
STEPHENS, Tania Jane <i>commonly known as Jane</i>	
TINDALL, Dawn Angela	
TITMUSS, John Austin	
WEBBER, Anthony David Canivet <i>commonly known as Tony</i>	



GENERAL ELECTION OF PEOPLE’S DEPUTIES   xx<sup>th</sup> June, 2020



GENERAL ELECTION OF PEOPLE’S DEPUTIES

xx<sup>th</sup> June, 2020   12 /13 PEOPLE’S DEPUTIES

Put X here

BREBAN, Brian David	
BURFORD, Yvonne	
DE LISLE, David De Garis	
DE SAUSMAREZ, Helen Lindsay <i>commonly known as Lindsay</i>	
DOREY, Mark Hirzel	
DUDLEY-OWEN, Andrea Catherine <i>commonly known as Milly</i>	
DUQUEMIN, Darren James	
FALLAIZE, Matthew James	
FLOUQUET, Bernard Marcel	
FORMAN, Neil Edward	
GARRETT, Michael Guy Gordon	
GOLLOP, John Alfred Bannerman	
GRAHAM, Richard Harold, LVO, MBE	
GREEN, Christopher James	
HADLEY, Michael Peter James	
HANSMANN ROUXEL, Sarah Taryn	
INDER, Neil Richard	

Put X here

KUTTELWASCHER, Jan	
MCMANUS, Caroline Jane	
MEERVELD, Carl Peter	
MERRETT, Jennifer Sue	
MOONEY, Joseph Ignatius <i>commonly known as Joe</i>	
OLIVER, Victoria Sarah	
PAGLIARONE, Lucia Faith	
PAINT, Barry John Edward	
PARKINSON, Charles Nigel Kennedy	
PROW, Robert George <i>commonly known as Rob</i>	
PETIT, Martin John	
PROUT, Stephen Michael	
QUERIPEL, Laurie Bryn	
QUERIPEL, Lester Carlson	
ROFFEY, Peter John	
ROUSSEL, Martyn Roy	
SOULSBY, Heidi Jean Renee	
SMITHIES, Jeremy Charles Stewart Fulford	

## Appendix 4

### Political parties

1. The Committee has included this brief note on political parties because in several places in the policy letter reference is made to political parties and the absence of political parties might affect the choice of possible electoral systems for Guernsey. The Committee is certainly not suggesting that political parties be introduced simply to facilitate any particular electoral system. It strongly believes that it is not the function of any parliament to engineer the foundation of a party system.
2. Political parties - that is groups of people who hold similar political aims and opinions who have organized, usually to contest elections so that they might form a government - have never been part of the political scene in Guernsey. From time to time parties have emerged but their existence has been short-lived and only very seldom have party representatives been successful in contesting seats in the States of Deliberation.
3. In jurisdictions which have no political parties government is, of necessity, consensual and Guernsey is no exception in this regard. Indeed this has long been held out as one of the reasons why the Island has had a sound and stable government for many years. Each and every Member of the States, whether or not a Committee President, is effectively a member of the government. No proposition can succeed without the consent of a majority of the Members which means that no Committee of the States can be certain of gaining States' approval in respect of any particular proposition.
4. In a party system, however, the government is formed by the party securing most votes in a general election (or, if no party has secured a majority of the seats, by an alliance of parties). Members of a party are generally required to vote in accordance with party policy which will have been set out in the party's election manifesto published prior to the election. It can be argued that in a coalition government the alliance of parties which form the government governs by consensus, but it is not fully consensual as the views of the minority who are not in government need not necessarily be taken into consideration. An alliance of parties is often necessary in jurisdictions in which a proportional representation voting system is used as it is seldom that a single party secures a majority of the seats available.
5. The presence of political parties allows more flexibility in the choice of the method of election of the members of the assembly and also results in greater certainty in the delivery of policy but this is balanced in non-political party jurisdictions with the freedom of each member to vote according to conscience rather being obliged to hold to party policy and the greater importance of each member's vote.